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ABSTRACT
 
Spacelab Mission Development Test III (SM] 
III) was the third in a

series of ground-based studies designed to test logistics and management

procedures for future Life Sciences space experiments, particularly

Spacelab. 
This study was the first collaborative effort of two NASA
 
centers, Johnson Spacecraft Center (JSC) and Ames Research Center (ARC).

ARC responsibilities were-to propose, develop, integrate and dg)iver a

payload of Life Sciences experiments to JSC where a 7-day simulation was

conducted. ARC developed documentation procedures, trained the crew on
the experiments and provided crew and management personnel as necessary

for the successful completion of the project.
 
A management study was initiated by ARC to specify SMD III activities

and problems. 
 This report documents the problems encountered and provides

conclusions and recommendations to project management for current and
future ARC Life Sciences projects. 
An executive summary of the conclusions
 
and recommendations is followed by the body of the report.
 
The last section of the report addresses broader issues relevant to
the conduct of future scientific missions under the constraints imposed by
the environment of space. 
Many of the procedures recommended-for consider­
ation in the last section grow out of the experiences of SMD III; others
 
are more general in scope and origin.
 
Section I
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
I. Purpose of this summary
 
A management study was initiated by ARC to 
document SMD III (Spacelab

Mission Development Test III) activities and problems. 
 The purpose oftthe
 
study was to provide conclusions and recommendations to project manage­
ment for current and future managers of ARC Life Sciences projects. This
 
Executive Summary is a brief summary of the study and it includes a set
 
of recommendations which are derived directly from that study. 
The
 
recommendations presented.here are relevant to Life Sciences as well as
 
other scientific participation in future space missions.
 
II. Introduction
 
SMD III was the third in a series of ground-based simulation experi­
ments'designed to test logistics and management procedures for Life
 
Sciences space experiments. 
 SMD III differed from earlier simulations in
 
that it was a dedicated Life Sciences mission; i.e., 
most of the experi­
ments on board dealt with humans or animals. All three simulations were
 
conducted at Johnson Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. However, since
 
most of the Life Science support is at Ames Research Center (Moffett Field,
 
California), it was decided to make SMD III a collaborative effort of
 
JSC-ARC. ARC responsibilities were: to propose human and animal experi­
ments for inclusion in the test; to develop the hardware for the experi­
ment and integrate it into the experiment racks; to deliver the payload

of equipment to JSC; to develop documentation procedures for Life Sciences
 
experiments; 
to conduct crew training for the ARC experiments; and to
 
provide Crew and Management personnel as necessary for the successful
 
completion of the project.
 
ARC Experiment Proposals were solicited April 9, 1976, and final
 
selections were made after an initial review of each proposal by a joint

JSC-ARC committee. The Crew was selected and began training first in the
 
individual Principal Investigator's labs, then at ARC with all ARC
 
experiments in the Spacelab configuration. The integrated equipment was
 
shipped to JSC on February 14 where it was re-assembled and double-checked­
in the simulator. 
The Crew then trained on all experiments individually

in the final Spacelab configuration. Final training was a preliminary
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run of two days of the actual seven day simulation. The seven-day bimulation
began May 17, only two days later than originally scheduled. The test was

successful: 
 it did not fall seriously behind schedule, and all experiments
but 	one produced usable data. 
ARC fulfilled its responsibilities for staff,

experiments and hardware, and ARC and JSC collaborated successfully in
 
bringing about the simulation. 1
 
Another goal of SMD III was to set up and test the operational problems

which would be associated with a Science Operations Remote Center (SORC).
Since most PIs were at ARC, and the simulation was conducted at JSC, a SORC
 
was set up at ARC which received data from the simulator in Houston for review
by individual PIs. 
 The SORC concept operated well once the data link was

established and there were few data handling problems during the simulation.
 
III. Major issues and recommendations
 
This-section draws primarily on interviews with ARC parficipants in SMD III.
 
A. 	Impact on other ARC activities was considerable in terms of diversion

of funds, equipment and manpower from usual scientific research. Initially,

reactions from participants were lukewarm and often resistant; however, later
in the project participants began to realize that demonstrating Ames' capability
was 	as important as 
the 	usual task of producing publishable scientific data.
It is recommended that steps be taken to 
assure 
that everyone knows priorities
 
from the start:
 
1. Explicit information should be provided to all project personnel

on center and directorate goals and long-term priorities at the
 
start of the project.
 
2. Participants should receive assurance that their normal job will
 
not 	be jeopardized if they choose to participate in the project.
 
3. 	Realistic estimates should be provided of time and travel require­
ments for project participants, based on SMD III experience.
 
B. 	Collaboration between ARC and JSC was generally excellent. 
The
 
problems which did arise suggest that:
 
4. 
As early as possible, the center responsible for initiating the

project should set up an information center to aid project par­ticipants in getting current information on earlier simulations,

mission guidelines, equipment integration requirements, documen­
tation procedures, and the status of various aspects of the pro­ject. Such an office should be accessible to all project person­
nel and would greatly aid in inter-center communications.
 
For better engineering coordination, early efforts should be
 
made to establish a team relationship between the engineers at
 
one center and engineers at the other, and between individual
 
PIs and the engineer responsible for their equipment.
 
2
 
6. 
If one center is responsible for delivering the animal payload

tp the other, it should review the animal 
-health and maihtenance

-procedures of the recipient chter in order to reduce ,concerns

of one center-with the procedures of the other.
 
C. The Science Operations Remote Center (SORC) was usefully employed for
real-time data presentations to the PIs and as a communications center for

relaying messages between Crew and PIs via the JSC Payload Operations Control
Center (POCC). In a real Life Sciences mission, the SORC could also have been
used as a laboratory in which to monitor ground-based control groups for -the

airborne experiments and for yoked air-ground studies for which PIs must be
 present. 
Experience in the SORC led to the following suggestions:
 
7. 	A cost-effectiveness evaluation of SORC(ARC)-POCC(JSC) vs.
 
POCC-SORC(JSC) should be conducted.
 
8. 
A clearer and more liberal policy for POCQ7SORC and-SORCCr6Ve
 
communications'sh'ofudbe defined to enhance the value'of the
 
SORC 	in terms of scientific productivity.
 
9. 	SORC Management should have access 
to all POCC communications.
 
A video link between POCC- and SORC would be helpful.
 
10. 	 As few restrictions as possible should be placed on PI-Crew
 
communications. 
Provide a separate voice channel for each
 
crew member.
 
11. 	 A hard copy printer should be provided as an additional means
 
of communications to the Crew. 
This is especially helpful for
 
-numeric or engineering information.
 
12. 	 Full video coverage should be provided to 
SORC, rather than 
slow scan. 
D. 	Principal Investigators. 
 In dedicated science missions, the central
role 	will be that of the Principal Investigator, whose research justifies the

entire project. The majority of PIs felt.5SMf III was an important learning

experience in the conduct of project research. 
They expressed a number of
 
concerns which lead to the following suggestions:
 
13. 	 PIs (especially non-NASA PIs) must be made aware of realistic 
time requirements, autonomy constraints, and procedural
requirements so they can appraise the impact of running a space 
­
flight experiment on their time and resources before committing
themselves to such a project. 
1-4. 	 An experienced NASA scientist should serve with outside PIs as
 
an experiment team coordinator and liaison between NASA project
 
management and the PI.
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15. 
 PIs and their liaisons should be consistently informed by

management, especially about any modifications in procedures

which may influence the conduct of their experiments.
 
16. 
 Duplicate sets of flight experiment equipment should be made

available to facilitate crew training and the PIs' ongoing
 
research.
 
17. As early as possible, a handbook should be provided to PIs
 
specifying the organizational and operational characteris­
tics and limitations of the mission. 
It should include:
 
a. 
An explicit statement of research goals and philosophy.
 
b. 	Space and hardware limitations of Spacelab.
 
c. 
Guidelines as to time-available for experiments (more

precisely estimated once experiments are integrated).
 
d. Realistic'estimates of the time demands on PIs for
 
design, training, integration, simulation, and flight

monitoring.
 
e. 
A statement of the organization of the project, in­
cluding the relationship of Crew and PIs to Manage­
ment and the role-of PIs in decision making regarding
 
the integration and execution of the experiment.
 
f. Delineation of the role of the crew member vis-a-vis
 
the PI in training and in the conduct of the experiment,

including specifications of in-flight communication
 
procedures and limitations.
 
18. 
 Paper flow should be filtered so that only relevant informa­
tion 	is sent to appropriate people.
 
19. 	 Clear lines of authority should be defined for decision
 
making about experiments.
 
20. 
 To ensure the best quality of science, early collaboration
 
should be encouraged between Crew, PIs, and their liaisons
 
on the assignment of Crew to specific experiments, procedures
development, and crew training. 
Extensive communication
 
among these individuals should be allowed and encouraged.
 
during the conduct of the experiment.
 
E. 	Crew. 
The precise status of crew members vis-a-vis Pis and witl~re­gard 	to their role in the execution of experiments was not clearly defined in
SMD III. There are two possible roles for a crew member: 
 (a) Technician,
limited to carry out the detailed instructions established by PIs, or (b)

Extension and collaborator of the PIs carrying out the research as a partner
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in the enterprise. 
We tend to support the view of crew member as scientist in
 
space, but in any case, Management should:
 
21. 	 Define the extent of 
crew autonomy in actual execution of the
 
studies, data collection, and consultation during flight.
 
22. 	Make explicit at the outset 
the lines of authority and communi­
cation between Crew and Science Management and Crew and PIs
 
(e.g., who is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of
 
preparations for particular experiments?).
 
23. 	 Define explicitly the role of back-up Crew and the'extent'of­
their commitments for training.
 
F. Management. 
The primary role of Management on a dedicated Life
Science mission should be to facilitate the safe and effective conduct of the
highest quality research. The management structure for SMD III 
was similar to
that used for previous simulations except that it was linked through the-
Mission Management Board'to JSC *An 
 effective m&nagement:team developed during
the course of the project. 
Comments aimed at improving a satisfactory

performance are:
 
24. 	 The management skills developed during SMD'III should be
 
tapped for future Life Sciences projects.
 
25. 	 Consistent communications should be created between Management

and PIs, keeping Pls informed on decisions concerning their

experiments, and keeping Management informed on PIs' progress.
 
26. 
 More 	clerical support should be provided to Managers to prepare

and distribute information, sending it only where needed and
 
perhaps labeling its importance (action required, background,
 
etc.).
 
27. 	 Procedures should be worked out before the project begins for
funding and executing projects that cross directorate or
 
division lines.
 
28. 
 There should be independent human factors review of equipment

and procedures prior to integration and again between inte­
gration, simulation and flight.
 
29. 
A complete plan should be developed for backing up allcrew
 
members and other critical personnel.
 
30. 	Managers should be free of other role commitments in the
 
project. 'For example, Managers who are also PIs probably do
 
not have the time and-objectivity to manage optimally.
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31. The relationships between Mission Specialists and Payload
 
Specialists-should be delineated,,vesting final authority
 
in a Science Manager.
 
32. 	 The establishment of a Science Liaison Manager to 
serve as
 
a communication link between all PIs or subsets of PIs and
 
Management should be considered.
 
G. Engineers. Overall, participants were highly pleased with the
 
quality of engineering support. Suggestions for improvement include:
 
33. 	 Lines of authority should be improved between Project
 
Management and Research Support Directorate (RSD). A
 
Manager for RSD in a senior line position on the project
 
.through 	whom all engineering requests could be channeled
 
would provide the necessary coordination.
 
34. A clear indication should be provided to Engineers from
 
senior Management that cooperation across normal organ­
izational lines is in fulfillment of the overall goals
 
of the organization.
 
H. Multiple commitments and time allocation in projects. Non-manager

scientists involved in such projects as SMD III could maintain multiple com­
mitments, both to project and non-project activities. For a substantial
 
number of participants, time appears to be available, although intermittently,
 
to pursue other activities. The following suggestions are aimed at facili­
tating this:
 
35. The Project Manager should plan and schedule project

activities as dependably as possible to enhance the
 
usefulness of remaining time.
 
36. 	 The Project Manager should encourage collaboration
 
in research efforts. 
This would ease time demands
 
on individual investigators and allow laboratory
 
operation to continue more smoothly.
 
37. Directorate Management can facilitate the success of
 
combining or alternating basic research and specific
 
projects by supporting individual scientists in dual
 
roles. A clear policy should be developed'and
 
promulgated.
 
I. Facilitating communication within the organization. Many problems

will disappear as the project concept matures, particularly if SM]IIII exper­
ienced individuals occupy significant roles in future projects. The majority
 
of the difficulties encountered in the conduct of SMD IIT arose from ambi­
guities in the specification of goals and responsibilities and from imperfect

lines of communication between relevant segments of the organization. These
 
problems have been addressed throughout this report, but some other simple
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basic procedures may prove valuable:
 
38. 	 Project commitment and'a feeling of team membership should 
be established by group gatherings (social interactions- ­
and meetings) and early public recognition of team members'
 
contributions, especially by upper management.
 
39. To help establish feelings of team membership in isolated
 
participants such as university PIs and separated co­
workers such as those with similar responsibilities at
 
ARC and JSC, NASA should provide an adequate travel budget
 
for 	face-to-face interactions.
 
40. 	 A series of leadership training seminars should be provided
 
by NASA for project management to discuss the roles to be
 
filled, possible conflicts between roles, and procedures to
 
monitor the effectiveness of role enactment.
 
41. 	 A series of regular organizational meetings should be
 
established for participants and Management to air problems,
 
establish rapport, .and exchange ideas. (Make the effort to
 
avoid one-way position presentations and simple gripe
 
sessions.)
 
42. 	 After.the overall structure of a mission has been determined
 
but before research plans and personnel assignments have
 
been made, these plans should be reviewed by an independent
 
project evaluation committee.
 
IV. 	 Future Research in Space
 
This section addresses issues relevant to the selection and development of­
scientific experiments that are to be executed in space. The problems of
 
selecting significant scientific proposals and developing these into an effi­
ciently integrated payload often lead to compromises in both the quality of
 
the science and the efficiency of the payload integration. We recommend
 
guidelines for selecting and developing studies, which emphasize the role of
 
the PI in the decision making, and the importance of early team work in payload
 
integration:
 
A. Selection and integration of experiments. Avoid the pitfall of
 
selecting experiments because they can be efficiently integrated and their
 
success is predictable:
 
1. 	The results of a candidate experiment should be:
 
a. 	Not precisely predictable in advance.
 
b. 	Unobtainable by other means (earth-based research or
 
simulation).
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C. 
Of potential theoretical or applied utility.
 
A multi-stage decision making procedure is recommended for selecting scien­tifically sound experiments and integrating them so that an efficient payload

is developed:
 
2. 	a. 
Initial proposals should be solicited which outline
 
the theoretical importance, general procedures, and
 
hardware required.
 
b. 	Scientific peer review should be employed to evaluate

the scientific merit of each proposal. 
In addition,
 
a NASA engineering committee should be employed to
determine the feasibility of translating the set of

research proposals deemed meritorious into an inte­
grated, efficient, on-board set'of experiments.
 
c. 
Proposals should be categorized as: 
 (1) not scien­
tifically worthwhile, (2) not technically
-feasible,
(3) worthwhile and feasible with technical or other

modifications, and 
(4) worthwhile and feasible as
 
proposed.
 
d. 
It should then be possible to group pr6posals by

theoretical or methodological similarities to ascer­
tain overlap between studies. 
At this point communi­
cation with category 3 and 4 PIs could take place.

Recommendations could be made (and limited funds
 
provided) that Pls sharing approaches consider an
integrated proposal and that further collaboration
 
with a NASA PI be explored.
 
e. 
Final proposals (revised, combined, more detailed)

should be accepted or rejected by further scientific
 
and 	technical review.
 
f. 
The 	impact of integration and later modifications on
 
scientific worth should be evaluated with an addi­
tional peer review before final integration to 
ensure
that scientific value is not lost due to "minor"
 
modifications deemed necessary to make it fit into
 
mission timelines and Spacelab characteristics.
 
In essence:
 
3. 
Maintain scientific excellence and create an effective PI-PI

and PI-Management team by having scientific review and inte­gration of experiments proceed hand-in-hand and by including

PIs early in the process.
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Additionally:
 
4. 
For 	zero-G experiments, great care should be taken to develop­timelie 
based not on earth-ideal working conditions,.but on
zero-G working conditions.. 
These timelines should be based
 
on the best estimates of persons who have objective knowledgev

of the problems of working in zero-G.
 
5. 	Data should be evaluated as 
they are being collected. The PI
should be prepared to pursue further any unanticipated findings
by allowing some flexibility in experimental procedures'and
 
timelines.
 
The importance of simulation.
B. The value of the SMD III simulation in
developing a management team and increasing the awareness and effectiveness of
PIs in research projects has been discussed previously.
 
6. 	Simulation of a dedicated science mission prior to flIght
is essential for the 
success of the research effort.
 
Rationale: 
 In a simulation the PIs gain experience with long
distance collaboration and direction. 
All participants develop

efficient procedures and communication channels and establish*
collegial relationships with the Crew. 
Management can determine
the amount of flexibility needed to capitalize on serendipitous
findings. 
All parties can rehearse or experience the effects of
equipment or procedural failures and can develop decision
strategies for coping with them or for eliminating them before
they can reroccur. 
Problems are still correctable, such as
learning the most effective methods of working with individual
project members and adjusting roles or working groups as needed.
 
Concluding statement: The experience of SMD III suggests that an
effective management team, selected from the personnel of a research
facility, can successfully direct complex Life Science research within
the 	constraints of a zero-G laboratory.
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Executive Summary
 
Footnote
 
1The reader is referred to the following sources for more detailed
descriptions of the project and recommendations for future Spacelab missions.
 
a. 
The SMD III Science Management Report, coordinated by John A. Rummel
 
and Paul X. Callahan. February, 1978.
 
b. 
Spacelab Mission Development III Test Operations Report, Glen H. Cress
 
III, August 29, 1977. 
 This report was originated from the JSC side

of.the project and refers the readers to other.JSC reports on 
SMD III.
 
c. 
Two articles referring to SMD III appeared- in Aviation Week and Space

Technology editions of May 9 and June 27, 
1977.
 
d. A handbook for managers of future prdjects such as 
SMD III is being

prepared by the authors. 
It is based largely on the results of the
 
SMD III Management Study.
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Section-II
 
A Critical Review of Ames Life Sciences Participation in
 
'Spacelab Mission Development Test III:
 
The SMD III Management Study
 
Robert Helmreich,2 John A. Wilhelm, Trieve A. Tanner,
 
Joan E. Sieber, and Susan Burgenbauch
 
INTRODUCTION
 
This report is the culmination of the SMD III Managemen.-Study1 an
 
investigation of the oAmes :Relearch Center participation in 
 SMD III 
(Spacelab Mission Development Test III). The study was designed to
 
monitor preparatory activities and the development of policies for the
 
test and to provide evaluations of those activities and policies in 
terms
 
of their contributions to the successes and'failures of the total project.:
 
The report is not designed to be a detailed chronicle of the-day-to-day
 
activities of either the development period or of the test itself, nor
 
will it discuss individually all of the critical events of the project.
 
The report is concerned with generic classes of critical events, policies,
 
and problems that we have synthesized from the specifics of the project,
 
although we will discuss particular examples as appropriate. Also, we
 
will discuss organizational and procedural methods that have been
 
developed for handling generic problems.
 
In this part we will give a brief -summary of the SMD III project.
 
and the Ames project management organization. More detailed descriptions
 
of the project and accounts of specific critical events and problems will
 
be found in other sources.
 
2
The work of Robert Helmreich, John Wilhelm and Susan Burgenbauch
 
was supported by NASA Grant NSG 2065, Robert Helnreich, Principal Investi­
gator. The work of Joan Sieber was supported by an Ames-University.Joint
 
ResearchAgreement (NCA2zOR290-705).
 
We wish to express our sincere appreciation to all of the individuals
 
who took time from-their busy schedules to provide'the information which
 
-'-makes up this report. We especially appreciate the thoughtful suggestions
 
for improvement in the project which must, of necessity, be presented
 
anonymously.
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The goals of SMD III were to assess the feasibility of a dedicated

Life Science space mission involving large numbers of on-board animals,
to evaluate the ability of two distant NASA-centers 
(ARC and JSC) jointly
to execute such a mission as essentially co-equal partners, and to

evaluate the feasibility of a Science Operations Remote Center 
(SORC, a
center for data presentation to project scientists). 
 The project was of
particular importance to the ARC Life Science Directorate as a test of
its ability to support such a collaborative effort, especially its

ability to staff the management organization necessary for the effort,

and to enlist the necessary support from other ARC directorates.
 
SMD III was a ground-based, dedicated Life Science simulation of
a Space Shuttle/Spacelab mission. 
The test itself was conducted at
Johnson Space Center from May 17 
to May 23, 1977, after a preparation

and development period of about one year. 
The test was accomplished

through the collaboration of Ames Research Center (ARC) and Johnson
Space Center (JSC). 
The responsible directorates at the two centers
 
were Life Sciences at ARC and Space and Life Sciences at JSC. 
They

were supported by Research Support and Administration Directorates
 
at ARC and the Flight Operations, Data Systems and Analysis, and Center
Operations Directorates at JSC. 
The payload consisted of fifteen

animal experiments, ten human experiments, one earth observation experi­
ment, and fifteen Operational Test Requirements (tests of hardware and
procedures common to several experiments). The Ames experiment pro­posals, submitted in response to a memorandum from the Deputy Director

of Life Sciences on April 9, 1976 (Appendix A), were reviewed by a

committee of peers. 
Proposals approved by the committee and Ames
 
management were submitted to a joint ARC-JSC committee for final
 
selection.
 
The experimental package was selected to 
cover a broad range of Life
Science research areas and to exercise as fully as possible the various

critical elements of the mission; e.g., hardware development, data handling,

and crew training. As this was a development mission, not a pre-flight

simulation, only partial attempts were made to impose zero-G constraints
 
on the design of the hardware or on the experimental package. 
Rather the
thrust was toward including many experiments in enough different areas to
stress the system to see where further development was needed. Major

research areas that were represented included cardiovascular and pulmonary
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physiology; vestibular functioning and motion sickness; and bone, muscle
 
and general metabolism. The experimental subjects for the Life Science
 
experiments were four monkeys, ninety-seven rats, six mice,'six frogs,

several hundred fruit flies, and three crew members (for the human
 
experiments). 
 The on-board Crew consisted of one Mission Specialist (a

career Science-Astronaut from JSC) and two Payload Specialists (both

physiologists, one from JSC, 
one from ARC). In addition, two Back-up

Payload Specialists were selected (one a physiologist, one a psychologist,
 
both from ARC).
 
Ames responsibilities for the project were -(a) to propose experiments
(both animal and human) for inclusion in the test, (b) to develop the
 
hardware and integrate all animal experiment hardware into the mission
 
equipment racks (actually the one JSC animal experiment was integrated.ac

JSC), (c) to provide procedures documentation for ARC animal experiments,
(d) to conduct crew Task Training on all ARC experiments, including

training for the ARC animal experiments in the ARC portion of the test
 
mock-up, (e) to select one Payload Specialist, (in fact, ARC also selected
the two Back-up Payload Specialists), (f) to staff and operate the SORC,

and (g) to supply appropriate project management personnel to accomplish

the other ARC responsibilities (these personnel included two members for
 
the inter-center Mission Management Board, viz. the ARC Project Manager
 
and Science Manager).
 
ARC participation in the project was 
formally initiated by the memo­
randum of 9 April 1976 from the Deputy Director of Life Science to selected
 
Life Science staff members. 
The period from that time to roughly mid-

October was primarily devoted to experiment selection and redesign, initia­
tion of hardware design and development, crew selection, definition of

experimental procedures documentation, planning of Task Training, and
 initial science briefings for the crew. 
Initiation of the Management Study

began in early October and data collection began the week of 31 October..
 
The period from late October until early February, 1977 was primarily

devoted to hardware development and integration, Task Training, and pro­
cedures documentation. For a few experiments, contrary to guidelines,

extensive methods development and equipment redesign continued during this
 
period.
 
On February 14 the ARC integrated hardware was shipped to JSC. 
From

mid-February to April 9 hardware integration and continued Task Training

occurred at JSC 
(primarily on JSC experiments and ARC human experiments).

The period from April 11. to April,29 was scheduled for Phase Training

(training in the mock-up following tentative mission timelines). However,

the last week of Phase Training and all subsequent scheduled activities
 
were delayed one week due to computer problems at JSC. A two-day simula­
tion of selected days from the seven-day test (Integrated Training) was
 
conducted on May 10 and 11. 
 The seven-day test (which we will refer to as

the simulation) began on May 17. 
 A more detailed chronology and classi­
fication of the critical time periods during the project is presented in
 
Part III.
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The ARC project management organization is shown in Figure 1. Al­
though the project is shown to be the responsibility of the Biosystems

Division, it should-be noted that the Biomedical Research Division and
 
the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Division (both also in Life Sciences)

also contributed members to the management team. 
 The day-to-day manage­
ment of the project was actually vested-in the Project Manager, who is
 
represented by the Project Office box, and the roles of the Directorate
 
and Biosystems Division management were chiefly those of financial support,

consultation, and when necessary resolution (with JSC Directorate manage­
ment) of inter-center policy discrepancies. The organizational diagram

shows five categories of personnel under the Project Office: 
 Manager,

Secretary, Contractor Managers, Crew and Principal Investigators. The
 dotted line between Managers and Principal Investigators represents limited
 
authority (to be discussed later). 
 Each of the three Life Sciences divi­
sions also contributed Principal Investigators for the ARC experiments.

Some of the management positions were filled by non-Life Science personnel
 
or non-NASA (contractor or university grantee) personnel. 
Som personnel
 
filled more than one role on the project, e.g., Management and Principal

Investigator. The April 9th memorandum-of the Life Science Deputy Director
 
alerted the directorate to the importance for total support from Life
 
Science personnel, in addition to 
soliciting experiment proposals. The
 
work time of some of the participants was totally committed to 
the project

for its duration, especially in the case of personnel who filled multiple
 
roles in the project.
 
In the achievement of the goals presented above, the project was
 
successful. The two centers involved were able to 
collaborate in the
 
execution of the mission; the Crew was able to 
conduct the payload experi­
ments within mission timelines; all but one of the experiments generated

valid data; and the SORC was operated successfully in support of the ARC
 
Principal Investigators. As suggested at the beginning of this introduc­
tion, the purpose of this report is to analyze the participation of the
 
ARC team members in order to abstract those aspects pZ. the participation
 
that contributed to or that detracted from the success of the project.

Our goal is to provide conclusions and recommendations, supported by

critical evaluation, that can be used by current and future project manag­
ers in planning, organizing, and managing similar projects. 
The recom­
mendations presented here are relevant to Life Sciences as well as other
 
scientific endeavors in future space missions.
 
In later sections of the report we discuss the importance of evalu­
ating personal roles and actions during the performance of critical tasks
 
by project personnel. We identify and evaluate the role that they played
(or would play) and how they would play it again in contributing to the
 
success or 
failure of SMD III or any similar project.
 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. In Part II we
 
develop a conceptua-l background that serves to 
organize later discussions
 
of personnel roles and interactions. Part III describes the method of the
 
management study and discusses some considerations about organizational
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research that influenced our approach. 
Part IV presents the data obtained
from-a written questionnaire used in surveying the project participants.
In Part V we discuss major issues and recommendations based on information

obtained from interviews supported by the questionnaire data. In Part VI,
the conclusion, we discuss implications for future Life Science space

research.
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
 
The rationale for studying the organization and management of SMD III
becomes clearer when we examine some characteristics of organizations and
management. 
 The description we offer of organizations and of management is
incomplete and-inelegant because no adequate theory or definition exists.
As Drucker (1974) explains, the organization is a fiction; 
it is the man4­agers who make the decisions. Yet, managers respond to the nature of their
task, their organization, and those who provide their resources and evalu­
ate their products. 
Thus, management decisions are highly'constrained and
fraught with conflict. An organization is, in part, a network of informa."
tion and work flow, and a healthy organization is one that continually

seeks more effective and satisfying information and work-flow networks.
However, the members of organizations are dependent on the procedures,

rules or habits they have learned. Thus, there is a tendency to get

"stuck" in a particular style, i.e., persisting even when that turns out
to be maladaptive in certain rules or habits. 
Getting unstuck is diffi­
cult since it requires willingness to seek information that may alter one'
 purposes, may indicate the weakness of the original approaches, and may

arouse ambiguity and negative feelings in members of the organization
(Argyris, 1976). 
 To engage in creative organizational change requires
both a willingness to experience these kinds of stresses, and the availa­bility of good information about what the organization is supposed to be
doing, how roles are articulated, and how the organization is-actually
 
operating.
 
Information of this nature can have useful objective and subjective
effects. Objectively, it can be used to create a more effective system

of information flow through role clarification and reduction of role

conflict, as we shall see presently. Subjectively, it creates rewards

and motivation for individuals within the organization, resulting in their

willingness to devote more energy to their work and to perform better.
For example, Oldham (1976) showed that motivation is increased substan­tially when managers define appropriate and speci-fic roles for employees,

and design feedback systems so 
that employees have objective information
 
on how effectively they are performing. 
Also, in the course of providing

a feedback system, managers gain an opportunity to perform an even more­
effective motivating function: 
 to recognize employees, personally and
 
warmly, when they have done a job well (Oldham, 1976).
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The other function of information -- to clarify and examine roles -­
is particularly important since role relationships in scientific research
 
organizations turn out to be extremelycomplex, ambiguous and fraught with
 
conflict. The resulting distress and inability to work effectively can be
 
extremely costly (House, 1974; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal,
 
1964). The examination and clarification of roles is a problem we have
 
undertaken in this study; we hope this will provide information that will
 
enable future management to improve information flow and role effective­
ness. Since problems of role ambiguity and role conflict were reported
 
throughout SMD III, we have drawn extensively on role theory to understand
 
what was happening, and to find ways to improve role effectiveness in NASA
 
scientific programs.
 
Role theory examines the forms of role conflict and ambiguity, their
 
causes and consequences, and ways of reducing these undesirable situations.
 
Role theory focuses on self-determination -- the ability of the individual
 
to learn both new roles and flexible integration of roles; the development
 
of this ability is considered to be effective socialization. (In contrast,
 
personality theory focuses-on-the individual's existing attributes and
 
tends to regard these as fixed -- however inadequate they may be). It was
 
in keeping with the aims of this study to focus on a flexible model of
 
social processes, such as role theory provides.
 
Typically, job training focuses on ability to fulfill a specific role,
 
yet major problems within organizations have to do with whether persons are
 
clear about which roles they should be fulfilling and whether they can
 
handle conflicting roles. Accordingly, we assume the competence of indi­
viduals to do what they think they should be doing, and focus on role ambi­
guity And role conflict. Role ambiguity results from failure to communicate
 
effectively to persons what they are to be doing. In SMD III, PIs and
 
engineers tended to report a great deal of role ambiguity early in the
 
study. Role conflict, on the other hand, has to do with incompatibility
 
of roles. For example, managers were given major administrative responsi­
bilities without the clerical support needed to fulfill those responsi­
bilities, and thus had to take time from managerial work to carry out
 
secretarial activities. Also, PIs who were also managers experienced
 
periods when competing sets of responsibilities required that they work
 
very long hours, and made difficult the effective discharge of both sets
 
of duties.
 
Research has indicated antecedents and consequences of role conflict,
 
relationships between type of position within the organization and types
 
and amount of role conflict, and ways of reducing role conflict.
 
Causes. Role conflict is directly related to degree of innovation
 
required, hence-to fulfillment of scientific research responsibilities
 
(Miles & Perreault, 1976); to amount of coordination required across
 
organizational boundaries (inside and outside of the organization) and
 
hence to managerial roles (Kahn et al., 1964); to supervision of personnel,
 
hence to managerial roles (Charters, 1952); and to performance under the
 
scrutiny of a powerful supervisor, hence usually to most members of middle
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management and lower echelons (Organ, 1971). 
 Research projects, using
 
scientists as managers, thus seem prime targets for role conflict and
 
ambiguity.
 
Consequences. 
Some consequences of role conflict are well-documented.
 
They include tension, anxiety, dissatisfaction, physical illness (especial­
ly heart disease), tendency to leave the organization, lack of confidence
 
in the organization, inability to influence decision making, and unfavor­
able attitudes towards those who provide the role expectations (Kahn,
 
Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964; House & Rizzo, 1972; Rizzo, House,
 
& Lirtzman, 1970; Tosi, 1971). 
 All of these were either reported or
 
observed during the course of SMD III. 
 Although we cannot necessarily

attribute cause for them to the project, these types of symptoms indicate
 
role enactment problems.
 
Kinds of jobs and patterns of role conflict they engender. Miles and
 
Perreault (1976) observed that scientist managers (that is, managers who
 
also maintain research responsibilities, here to be called Principal

Investigator/Manager) experience the highest levels of role overload in
 
scientific research programs, and also experience high levels of role
 
conflict. Typically, these are talented individuals who are chosen for
 
their ability in their research specialty, their ability to lead research
 
teams, and their ability to represent the organization to other sectors
 
such as contractors, funding sources, and top management. Thus; they are
 
exposed to multiple role requirements involving chronic stress, for which
 
there seem to be substantial Realth and morald costs.
 
Another role that is perhaps less complex, but more unpleasant and
 
stressful is that of the nonPl-manager, whose primary responsibility is
 
to 
integrate activities strictly within the organization. While managers
 
do not have as much role overload as P1/Managers, they experience much
 
more role conflict, exascerbated by the fact that they work under closer
 
scrutiny of relatively more powerful members of the organization (Miles &
 
Perreault, 1976).
 
Generally, the only persons who do not experience much role conflict
 
are the highly buffered scientists 
-- the PIs who do not have management
 
responsibilities. However, these individuals who experience little role
 
conflict also experience their roles as less powerful and less effective
 
than those of the highly conflicted personnel! (Miles & Perreault, 1976).
 
Analysis of roles and role conflicts shows that, by the very nature
 
of scientific organizations, certain roles are necessarily fraught with
 
conflict. And when communication is poor, role ambiguity adds to the
 
problem. However, steps 
can be taken to reduce the conflict as well as
 
the ambiguity.
 
Person-role conflict can be managed effectively through careful
 
selection and placement, so that personnel are given jobs that they feel
 
like doing. SMD III has provided valuable information about the kinds of
 
jobs that various individuals would prefer. Role conflict can be reduced
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by management through establishing more precise role definitions in the
 
organization. Also, leadership training can sensitize people to when they
 
,are sending conflicting expectations, and teach-them to acknowledge and at
 
least attempt to soften'the difficult conditions they.create. What must
 
also be developed is sensitivity to the difficulties of spanning organiza­
tional boundaries and integrating organizational functions, and to ways of
 
reducing these difficulties.
 
Role overload can be alleviated by attempting todesign jobs to even
 
out pressures and responsibilities.
 
In the following parts of this report, role theory will-be employed 
-
to examine the operation of SMD III and to explore ways in which scientific
 
and managerial roles can be made more effective.
 
III. THE STUDY OF SMD III: PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 
The researcher must confront a number of seriousmethodological and
 
ethical issues when studying an existing organization. Most of these
 
issues center around the fact that the professional and/or vocational
 
performance ofoindividuals rather than-their isolated responses are under
 
examination. Because of the importance of these issues and their possible

impact on the quality of obtained information, it is appropriate to consider
 
them before describing the detailed procedures followed in the study.
 
Ethical Problems in the Study of Organizations
 
Typically, organizational research focuses on roles and processes in
 
organizations as a whole rather than on the behavior of particular indi­
viduals within the organization. The purpose of the research is to achieve
 
understanding (and perhaps imprdvement) of the organization. The decision
 
to initiate research usually comes from a high-ranking member of the organ­
ization, who requests or directs other members of the group to participate

and cooperate. Researchers then gather data using such techniques as
 
observation, interviews, and examination of archival records. 
Thus, it is
 
easy to overlook the rights of individuals within the organization and their
 
personal concerns about the impact of the research on their status. 
However,

the costs of neglecting these concerns are potentially high. They include:
 
actually harming research participants through breach of privacy or confi­
dentiality (with the possible consequence of gossip or unfavorable personnel

action); upsetting participants; motivating participants to falsify the­information they provide or'to refuse to participate; creating a reservoir'
 
of ill-will within the organization; and creating strong resistance to any

subsequent efforts to examine systematically and improve the organization.-

In order to respect the rights and needs of participants in organiza­
tional research, the researcher needs a clear understanding both of the
 
actual risks and benefits to all parties involved and of the kinds of
 
grounded and ungrounded fears that members of the organization are likely
 
20 
to entertain. For example, it is entirely reasonable for members of an
 
organization to wonder whether research findings could result in personnel
 
actions such as raises, promotions, transfers or firings of employees even
 
if no such use is intended by either researchers or sponsoring management.
 
It is the responsibility of the researcher to communicate with participants
 
in a clear and credible way to prevent the generation of high levels of
 
anxiety about consequences of the investigation.
 
Specific Goals and Approaches
 
The aim of this research was to study the management and execution of
 
SMD III in order to identify the organizational processes and problems that
 
should be taken into account in the planning and conduct of future projects
 
by NASA.
 
The aim was not to evaluate individuals who participated in SND III.
 
Indeed, the aim was not to evaluate SMD III per se, but rather to learn
 
about generic processes and problems that can be expected to be a part of
 
programmatic, mission-oriented scientific activities. The idiosyncracies
 
of individuals or activities are of interest dnly-if they'are likely to be
 
found in one form or another in subsequent situations. Ideally, the use of
 
this work will be in planning the effective development of future projects.
 
Several procedural guidelines were established with management and
 
with individual participants before data collection was undertaken. One
 
was that the research team would document the processes and problems en­
countered in SMD III without involving itself in the actual conduct of the
 
project. One of us (Tanner) took on a management role after the research
 
was begun. To avoid influence on the project, he did not examine any of
 
the interview or objective data until the project was completed. Members
 
of the team would not attempt to influence the activities of the project in
 
any way and would not serve as informal channels of communication among
 
members of the organization. While individuals would be contacted regularly
 
and their personal responses and perceptions recorded, the focus would be on
 
the specification of generic issues. Data collected by the team on indi­
viduals would not be divulged to others.
 
Objective data were identified only by a code number and were maintained
 
in computer resident files, making it impossible to identify respondents.
 
Interview material and notes were returned to respondents after content
 
analyses. Individual comments, where used, are presented without attribu­
tion or identification.
 
Several procedures were followed to obtain the informed consent and
 
cooperation of project members. Participants were told by letter and in a
 
briefing the purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and the
 
potential value to NASA. The letter sent to project personnel is reproduced
 
as Appendix B.
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Participants were individuals from Ames Research Center who were
 
actively involved in SMD III or whose previous work in similar projects
 
made them valuable commentators on the undertaking. Additional informa­
tion was obtained from Ames management personnel whose operations were
 
directly or indirectly impacted by SMD III.
 
An unfortunate limitation of the study was the fact that research
 
planning and data collection were not begun until the project was well
 
underway. The first data were not obtained until the week beginning
 
October 31, 1976, and the SMD project was formally initiated April 9 of
 
the same year. Therefore, systematic contemporaneous data on initial
 
organization, experiment selection, and early integration are lacking.
 
However, retrospective reports of activities and problems were solicited
 
and some first hand information was supplied by one of the authors (Tanner)
 
who was involved with the project in various capacities from the beginning.
 
Sources of Data
 
Two main sources of data were utilized, questionnaires and semi­
structured interviews. The basic questionnaire was given weekly. Respond­
ents were asked for the allocation of time to various activities, completion

of a checklist of problems encountered during the week, and specification of
 
groups interacted with as part of the project.3 Space was also provided for
 
comments on notable events. A final questionnaire was given forty-five days
 
after the simulation asking for perceptions of the success and value of the
 
project, both personally and for NASA, the importance of future simulations,
 
and willingness to participate again. Both questionnaires are reproduced in
 
Appendix C.
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain information about
 
problem areas encountered, reactions concerning organization and training,
 
evaluation of personal roles and the project in general, and recommendations
 
3Because of time pressures in undertaking a study of an ongoing project,
 
it was not possible to pilot test the items and activity categories on the
 
weekly questionnaire. During initial weeks of data collection we asked for
 
criticisms and recommendations from participants with regard to the instru­
ment. As a result of this feedback, an alternate classification of time
 
allocation was developed and made optional for respondents. As it turned
 
out, only two individuals, both contractors, used this form throughout. One
 
manager used the alternate system for a few weeks, then returned to the ori­
ginal form. Data for these weeks are not included in the analysis. Because
 
of the limited amount of data using this system, only data on total project
 
time for these respondents are included in the discussion of activity break­
downs.. 'Data on the discrepancy between time planned and time actually spent
 
on project work were not included in the analyses because participants re­
potted that this was extremely difficult to estimate. Most reported that they
 
really had no idea at the beginning of a week how much time would be required
 
each week for SMD and could not, therefore, estimate discrepancies.
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for the conduct of future missions and simulations. Most participants were
interviewed at least twice, once at the-beginning of the study and, once
 
after completion of the simulation. 
 Several central personnel were inter­
viewed a number of times while others who were more peripherally involved
 
were seen only once. The number of interviews per person ranged from one
 
to seventeen.
 
In all, forty-seven individuals provided data on their roles or per­
ceptions of the project. 
A total of 118 interviews were conducted and
 
twenty-seven final questionnaires were obtained. 
Thirty-two participants

began filling out the weekly questionnaire when the study began. 
Several
individuals dropped off the project later, others were ill or on leave for
 
one or more weeks, and some were unable to complete one or more forms
 
kecause of travel or other commitments. 
A total of 786 weekly question­
naires were returned and coded for a weekly average of 82% return.
 
Data Reduction. To provide some reduction in the mass of objective

data collected and to examine group phenomena, mission participants were

classified as belonging to one of five groups: 
 PI, Principal Investigators

for ARC experiments with no other specified roles in the project; P1/Manag­
ers, ARC Principal Investigators with additional project management respon­
sibilities; Managers, ARC personnel with only management responsibilities

for SMD III; Contractor/Manager, ARC contractors with management related
 
roles in the project; and Crew, ARC prime and backup 
crew members.
 
One problem in the analysis of data was that 
three individuals changed

role category during the course of the project. In analyses across time,

individuals were classified according to 
the category filled during each
 
time period. Initially, due to 
the heavy demands of Life Sciences for
 
engineering and shop support from other directorates, we felt it inappro­
priate to impose the systematic research program on personnel in these
 
areas. 
 Therefore, questionnaire data were not taken and these individuals
 
are not included in our categorization of project personnel. 
Later, when
 
project demands had eased, interviews were conducted with key personnel in
 
the Research Support Directorate.
 
Project Chronology
 
Thirty weeks of longitudinal questionnaire data were collected for the
project management study. As mentioned previously, the study did not begin

until about six months after the start of the project. To facilitate data
 
analysis these thirty weeks, which began October 31 were reduced to seven
 
logically coherent time periods (Figure 2). 
 Each period is labelled

according to 
the dominant events during each interval. Obviously a variety

of activities were underway at both centers during each period.
 
A short description of the major events of the project during the manage­
ment study will help to clarify our selection of these time periods. 
The
 
top line of the major events section of Figure 2 deals exclusively with
 
training. Task Training at ARC for the ARC and JSC Crew was 
completed in
 
weeks 1, 3, and 6 and 7 of period 1. 
This training was conducted on the
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equipment in the laboratories of the individual PIs and included much
definition of the tasks to be executed. 
Thus period 1 is labeled "Task
definition and training." 
 Looking at period 2, "mock-up integration and
training," we note that the mock-up facility was constructed and the hard­
ware integrated into it, and that the equipment and animal holding
facilities were tested. 
Week 10 had been scheduled as a training week at
ARC, but as the PIs' equipment (which
was 
taken from their laboratories

where the initial task training had been conducted) was not yet completely
integrated and there was no back-up equipment, it was cancelled. 
By weeks
13 and 14 Task Training was resumed using the equipment as integrated in
the mock-up and a pre-shipment review double-checking the correct function­ing of all integrated equipment and procedures was completed. 
 In the
third period, the mock-up and all equipment to be shipped to JSC (the pay­load) were packed, shipped, and re-assembled in the simulator at JSC.
During the last two weeks of this period, two training weeks were scheduled
but cancelled due to problems at ARC with the health of 
some experimental

animals and at JSC due to hardware problems. The problem with animal
health continued across several periods. 
Task Training at JSC was the
dominant activity in period 4, which ended with the science verification
tests of all previously untested experiments as integrated in the simu­lator. 
Phase Training occupies most of period 5. 
Note that Phase Training
was interrupted because of data transmission problems for one week and then
completed. 
This delay slipped the schedule for the simulation by one week.
Had another week's delay occurred, the simulation would probably have been
cancelled because of limitations on ARC resources, contracts, and animal
considerations. 
 But the project went smoothly from there on. 
 Integrated
Training (a 2-day training in the complete, functioning simulator) was
completed during period 6, and the 7-day simulation mission, SORC activi­ties, and debriefing were completed by the end of period 7.
 
IV. RESULTS: TIME COMMITMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND INTERACTIONS
 
In this part we will describe the time allocation, major problems, and
group interactions for the total group of participants, and will examine
these factors for the various subgroups of participants across time. These
purely objective data provide a feeling for the impact of the project on its
participants and for the types of hurdles encountered. 
They will be ampli­fied by more qualitative material obtained from comments and interviews.
Although t'heexact patterns of results are likely to differ from project to
project, these data should have considerable utility in charting the differ­
ential demands of such endeavors across time.
 
Allocation of Project Time
 
Table I presents the average amount of time per week (in hours) spent
on each activity by participants in each classification. Looking at the
overall average, total time commitment averaged 24.14 hours a week. 
Paper­
work and meetings concerned with general administration of the project
(including completion of reports, forms, requests, and briefings) took up
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TABLE 1
 
Amount of Time Per Week Spent on Each Activity
 
for Each Type of Participant in SMD III
 
Activity 
PI Only 
(17) 
PI/Hgr 
(N=4) 
Manager 
(N:8) 
Con/Mgr 
(N=4) 
Crew 
(N=3) 
p Value Average for 
all Groups 
Total Time (all 
entries in hours) 
12.74 47.18 27.89 36.82 31.19 .001 24.14 
Paperwork and 
Gen! Admin. 
1.93 17.95 10.55 8.41 2.32 .001 6.38 
Program 
Modification 
.39 1.42 1.99 .18 1.08 H1S 0.90 
Equipment 
Design/Redesign 
4.25 5.99 3.23 11.54 4.07 NS 5.01 
Clarification, 
follow-up & 
monitor 
1.44 16.28 7.43 12.45 2.78 .023 5.75 
Training 2.82 2.21 2.51 .11 17.59 .001 3.61 
Animal Handling 1.54 2.87 .36 0.00 0.18 NS 1.14 
Data Collection 
& Analysis 
.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 NS 012 
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the single largest block of time, 6.38 hours per week. This was followed
 
by clarification, follow-up and monitoring (which includes seeking or
 
providing information on experiments or programs, SORC or mission monitor­
ing, and crew activities during the mission). 4 The total for this cate­
gory was 5.75 hours per week. Overall, project administrative activities
 
required more time than any other single activity.
 
Equipment design/redesign (which includes actual work on the components
 
of experiments or related equipment) followed with an average commitment of
 
5.01 hours per week. Training (including the planning and execution of
 
training sessions and PI time spent with Crew) required an average of 3.61
 
hours per week. These major activities were followed by smaller commitments
 
including animal handling (1.14 hours), program modification (0.90 hours),
 
and data collection and analysis (0.12 hours). 5 Uncategorized, miscellaneous
 
activities accounted for another 0.85 hours per week.
 
Analysis of Activities Between Groups and Across Time. In this section
 
we will examine each activity to see how the groups of participants compare
 
overall and across each time period. As previously noted, taking the pro­
ject as a whole, "paperwork and general administration," "clarification,
 
follow-up and monitoring," "equipment design/redesign" and "training"
 
occupied most of the total mission time. Within the total group of parti­
cipants we have the five subgroups. The roles each group plays in the
 
simulation are different, and these roles are reflected in their allocation
 
of time to activities.
 
Total Time. The groups show statistically significant differences for
 
total time, paperwork, and general administration, clarification and follow­
up and monitoring, and-training. The other major activity, equipment design/
 
redesign, showed so much variation within the five groups by individual that
 
the overall differences between group means were not statistically signiti­
cant., For total time (as measured by either the original or alternate time
 
categories), PI/Managers reported spending-the most hours per week (47.18)
 
working on SMD-related activities. As this is an average over 30 weeks, the
 
time they devoted to the project is truly remarkable. This group was fol­
lowed by Contractor/Managers with 36.82 hours, Crew with 31.19, Managers
 
with 27.89, and PIs with 12.74. The only group spending less than two-thirds
 
of a normal 40-hour work week on SMD-related activities was the PI group.
 
4An unplanned outcome of the early classification system was that this
 
category became something of a grab-bag in that it may refer to different
 
activities for different people at different points during the project; for
 
example, it records follow-up for the entire mission, Crew performance during
 
the mission, and SORC monitoring for PIs during the mission.
 
5Although not specified on the questionnaire, animal and data activities
 
were listed so consistently in the "other activities" category that we pulled
 
them from it and created two new activities. Obviously, we too have learned
 
from our participation in the project.
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Figure 3 shows the average weekly time each group reported for all acti­
vities for each of the seven time periods. Immediately apparent is that
 
the PI groups' participation differs from other groups throughout the
 
mission: the PIs maintained a constant participattonof approximately 12
 
hours per week across all time periods, while the other groups start out
 
with about 35 hours participation, drop to about 25 hours during equipment
 
integration at JSC, and rise again until, by the time of Integrated
 
Training and simulation (periods 6 and 7), all four groups are averaging
 
more than 40 hours per week.
 
Paperwork and General Administration. PT/Managers spent more time
 
than other groups on paperwork and general administration, almost 18 hours
 
per week. They were followed by Managers (10.55 hours) and Contractor/
 
Managers (8.41 hours). Thus, all the managerial groups, not surprisingly,
 
reported the most paperwork and general administration time. Figure 4
 
plots the time spent per week in paperwork and administration for each time
 
period by group.6 The PT/Managers were devoting most time to paperwork and
 
administration during the task definition and ARC Task Training period,
 
during Task Training at JSC when animal health was in question ('see Problem
 
Areas, p. 38), and during the simulation and debriefing period. Managers
 
followed this pattern to a great extent, but showed a constant rather than
 
increasing paperwork and administration load during the simulation. The
 
Crew's paperwork and administration time dropped slowly to nothing for the
 
Phase Training period and then increased with the debriefings for the
 
Integrated Training and simulation. The PI group remained fairly constant
 
throughout the project.
 
Program Modification. Although program modification showed nonsigni­
ficant variation among the groups, several observations can be made about
 
its pattern across time. Figure 5 shows that almost all program modifica­
tion had ceased by the time of the actual simulation, but was preceded by
 
a slight increase for P1/Managers and PIs during Integrated Training.
 
Across the first five periods, Managers and PIs were fairly consistently
 
involved in program modification activities, with Crew being fairly involved
 
during the first two periods and then dropping off. PT/Managers fluctuate
 
dramatically across periods.
 
Equipment Design/Redesign. Equipment design/redesign work was done to
 
a great extent by Contractor/Managers and PI and PT/Manager groups. All of
 
the groups seemed to follow the same general trend, an increase between the
 
first and second periods reflecting the mock-up integration activities,
 
drops for periods 3 and 4, increases for 5 and 6 for final integration in
 
the simulator at JSC, and a drop almost to nothing by period 7 (Figure 6).
 
6As noted earlier some of the Contractor/Managers used the alternate
 
time categories. Because of the fragmented data resulting, this group is
 
not considered in these breakdowns.
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Clarification, Follow-up and Monitoring. 
The P1/Managers, Contractor/
Managers and Managers showed the largest amount of time on clarification,

follow-up and monitoring. As mentioned previously, this activity variable
 
covers different activities at different times. 
 For periods 1-5 it means

clarification and follow-up, but for periods 6 and 7 it means mission

monitoring (SORC) and Crew participation in the simulation as well as
 
clarification and follow-up. 
 The increase in simulation-related activities
 
can easily be seen in Figure 7. Given the ambiguities in the meaning of
this activity, we will not speculate on the specific pattern over the 
seven
 
time periods for each group.
 
Training. The Crew reported an average of 17.50 hours training per

week with the next highest group, PIs, reporting only 2.82 hours. Training

activities include training, being trained, and all training-related acti­
vities. 
All groups except Contractor/Managers were involved in the training

of the Crew. 
All groups showed peaks during periods 2, 5, and 6, and all

showed a marked drop at period 3, equipment integration at JSC (Figure 8).

These were training periods in which the Crew was having intense training
 
on equipment integrated into the mock-up atAmes (period 2)_and the simu­lator at JSC (periods 5 and 6). Training activities had ceased by the time
 
of the simulation.
 
Animal Handling. No significant differences were noted overall between
 
the' groups for animal handling. 
However, the only groups reporting notice­
able amounts of time in this experiment-related activity were PT/Managers

and PIs. 
From Figure 9 we note that the PIs show the most animal handling

activities during the JSC Task Training period and Phase Training, while
 
the PT/Managers' work peaks during Integrated Training and the actual

simulation. 
This activity was directly related to the animal experiments

which were the responsibilities of PI and PT/Manager groups. 
 The first
 
peak was refated to Task Training and science verification tests, the last
to Phase and Integrated Training and preparation of animals for the simu­
lation experiments.
 
Data Collection and Analysis. 
 The PI group reported almost all of the
data analysis activity. 
Figure 10 shows that this activity was concentrated
 
early in the project with the design and testing of equipment and then during

the actual simulation and debriefing for experimental results and SORC data
 
monitoring activities.
 
Summary. 
The data show clearly that differences in time allocation

reflect project roles, particularly in the relative weight of activities to
total commitment. 
The differences in time requirements for the specific

activities across time are very large. 
While the actual allocation of time
 in future projects will doubtless be very different, the pattern shown here
 
may be a useful guideline for such undertakings.
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Problem Areas for the Project
 
a
In-the problems section of the weekly questionnaire, respondents were
 
asked-to check which of eleven problem categories they had encountered in
 
the week being reported. These areas were: (1) Personnel 

- lack of or
 
quality of personnel support; (2) Equipment redesign problems; (3) Problems
 
caused by scheduling or execution of training (4) Problems in getting

needed information; (5) Problems in interfacing with other SMD experiments;

(6) Problems caused by interference of SMD with non-SMD work activities;
(7) Equipment integration problems; (8) Timeline or scheduling problems;

(9) Problems in interfacing with JSC; (10) Paperwork problems of any type;
 
and (11) Other uncategorized problems.7 For each week respondents checked
 
one or more problem areas or left them blank. 
Table 2 shows the percen­
tages of each category of participant who checked the various problem m'tr
 
categories in an average week. Examining the column giving the average

for all groups, it can be seen that three problems were reported by at
 
least 20 percent of all respondents in an average week. These were prob­
lems with equipment (design/redesign or integration),-in interfacing-with-,

JSC, nnd in'getting heeded information. 
 e
 
One major problem transcended the category system we had devised.
 
This was the question of verifying animal health for-the simulation. A
 
committee set u to rule on questions of animal health did not establish
 
guidelines until quite late in project development (February). At this
 
time it was specified that monkeys had to be free of the "B virus" 
(Herpes

Simiae, which has proved fatal in rare instances of transmission to humans).

A number of the ARC primates were found to be possible latent carriers of
 
the disease. The issue then became the establishment of standards to verify

that animals for the simulation were free of the virus. 
The resolution of
 
this question extended over a period of weeks. During its course it
 
threatened timelines, training, integration of experiments, and relation­
ships between the two centers. To facilitate resolution of the problem,
 
one PI assumed additionaf management responsibilities for the last half of
 
the project. The management implications of this situation will be
 
discussed in Part VI.
 
The equipment problem was ARC-specific and somewhat expected, given

the scope of the engineering and integration task. The magnitude of the
 
problem with interface between the two centers suggests that project

planners were correct in their perception that difficulties would arise in
 
merging the activities of two geographically isolated groups with different
 
histories and orientations. 
Getting needed information is not unrelated.,to

the problem of inter-center coordination. Because ARC Life Science had
 
little experience in mounting this kind of project and because final inte­
gration was to take place in Houston, much of the needed information had to
 
7Since equipment design/redesign and integration problems showed such
 
similarities, we combined them into an "equipment problem" category. 
If
 
either original equipment problem was checked, we tallied a problem with
 
equipment.
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TABLE 2 
Percent of Participants in Each Group Reporting 
A Problem in an Area on an -Average Week 
Problem Area PI's PI/Managers Managers Contractor/Managers Crew Averagefor all grps 
Number of Problems .77 3.01 3.33 1.09 2.37 1.67 
per Week 
Personnel Problems 2 23 32 15 7 12 
Equipment Problems 16 48 34 22 32 25 
Training Problems 8 18- 33 0 43 16 
Problems Getting Needed 8 35 41 16 34 20 
Information 
Problems Interfacing 3 36 18 4 14 11 
with Other SMD Exp. 
Problems Between SMD 9 17 31 1 18 14 
and Non-SMD Activities 
Problems with Timelines 3 19 25 12 29 12 
Problems Interfacing 10 44 55 12 25 24 
with JSC 
Problems with Paperwork 8"'< 31 27 10 .... 12 15 
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be-ferreted out from various components at JSC. However, many of the prob­
leis *in information exchange were internal to ARC, especially between
 
various groups of participants and will be discussed in greater detail in
 
a later section. These major problem 'areas- were followed -by- problems­
occurring wi-th a moderate frequency: training (reported by 16 percent'of
 
respondents), paperwork (15 percent) and problems between SMD and non-SMD
 
activities (14 percent). 
Personnel, interface of SMD experiments, and
 
timeline problems were reported less frequently overall, but with at least
 
10 percent of the respondents reporting each of these problems in an
 
average week.
 
Problem Areas by Type of Participant and Across Time. An examination­
of the avetage number of problems per week reported by.each group-indicates

that ARC Managers were the group most plagued by problems of all kinds
 
(averaging 3.33 problems per week). PI/Managers followed with 3.01 prob-­
lems. The Contractor/Managers reported considerably fewer problems (1.09)

than the other managerial groups, but this is to be expected as they were
 
assigned specifically to SMD III in a fairly limited role. 
They were not
 
concerned with problems..between SMD-and non-SMD activftis 'ofw
Vi train2 
....
ing4, The role of management as a problem-solving component is highlighted
 
by these data. The Crew also reported a large number of problems, 2.37 per

week. The PIs were far behind the Managerial groups and Crew, reporting
 
.an average of only .77 problems per week. The specific problems which make
 
up this overall total and their distribution throughout the mission wilt b6
 
discussed next.
 
Personnel Problems. Problems with the-quality or quantity of personnel
 
support were not frequently reported in the simulation. The managerial
 
groups reported almost all of these problems, especially the pure Management
 
group. Since the managerial staff had more groups reporting to them, it is
 
reasonable that personnel quantity and quality should be primarily a manage­
ment problem. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the personnel problem
 
across the project. PureManagers reported persohnel'problems,fairly-con­
,sistentlythroughout the project. PT/Managers, however, show an increased
 
number of personnel problems during the latter phases of the project,
 
especially during the integrated training.
 
-Equipment Problems. Equipment problems were-reported by all groups of 
participants. PT/Managers reported this problem in almost half of their 
questionnaires. Equipment problems were the single most frequently reported
 
problem for the Contractor/Managers and PIs for whom hardware development
 
was a primary concern, and were a constant irritation for the other groups
 
as well. Inspection of Figure 12 shows that all groups show a gradual 

- 1 
decline in the number of equipment-related problems throughout the mission.
 
Training Problems. Training problems were reported mainly by the
 
.Manager groupwhich-was respoisible for training doordination, and by the
 
'Crew-who were the fo'cus of training activities. It is interesting that
 
while the number of problems reported by Managers stays fairly steady-and
 
even drops slightly as the mission moves toward the simulation (Figure 13),

the Crew reports an increase. This probably due to the fact that some
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Managers remained at ARC for the Phase and Integrated Training. Specifi­cally,. the Ames Training Coordinator had essentially completed his Task
Training responsibilities. 
The Crew, which was at JSC for these periods,
intensified their trainifig commitments. 
The Crew, in fact, reported
training problems during the seven-day test. 
 This was clarified in com­
ments made by crew members. They reported problems during the test
because they felt that training did not adequately prepare them for the

workload. 
Even the two mission days selected for the Integrated Training

were not representative of the more intense workload required during the
 
actual simulation.
 
Problems-Getting Needed Information. 
Managers, PI/Managers and Crew
all reported considerable difficulty in getting the information they needed
for various aspects of their work. 
As previously mentioned, much of this
 
was inter-center related. 
Figure 14 shows that problems getting informa­tion declined for all groups during the ARC phases of the mission and
increased dramatically during the JSC .phases of the mission. I-h&< g s....and -P-I/Minage-s'repbrted sp&cial communication problems with JSC during

the Integrated training and simulation periods, the periods of peak

involvement with JSC.
 
Problems Interfacing-with Other SMD Experiments. 
 While this-was over­all the least reported problem, it appears that it was a problem particular
to PI/Managers, especially during the early parts of the mission when their
experiments were being integrated into the mock-up simulator at ARC and
during the actual simulation (Figure 15). 
 The Crew reported problems inter­facing SMD experiments both during the Integrated Training period and during
the simulation itself. 
The Integrated Training and the simulation itself
 
were the periods when the Crew had to work with all the experiments together
following a timeline rather than on each experiment separately.
 
Problems Between SMD and Non-SMD Activities. Managers reported the

majority of the problems occurring beftween SMD and non-SMD activities.
Given the fact that the mission was not one which freed the participants
from other duties, it is surprising that it was not more of a problem than
it was. 
Figure 16 shows this particular problem throughout the mission.
Managers faced problems between SMD and non-SMD activities throughout the
entire mission, but were especially impacted during the latter part of the

mission when their time commitment to the simulation was great. PI/Managers
faced 
-conflicts with non-SMD activities mainly during the mock--up integra­tion and training period. The Crew particularly felt impact from.SMD parti­cipation on their non-SMD activities during the Task Training at JSC and
Phase Training periods when interviews revealed that the cancelled training

periods disrupted their other activities.
 
-Timeline Problems. 
Problems with timelines or schedules were not
frequently reported by any group, but Crew, Managers, and PI/Managers

reported them more often than others on the project. 
Figure 17 shows some
interesting patterns across the project. 
Managers were most concerned with
timelining and scheduling throughout the mission. 
However, the other groups

show strikingly consistent peaks during the mock-up integration and training
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7 
period, a major deadline for ARC, and during the Task Training period at
JSC when the animal problem was being solved. P1/Managers showed
increasing timeline problems during the Integrated Training and during the

simulation itself when the Crew was reporting problems meeting the time­lines. 
The role of Management in scheduling is highlighted by these
 
problems.
 
Problems Interfacing with JSC. 
Managers' most frequently cited problem
and P ' and PT/Managers' second most frequently cited problem was interface

with JSC. 
 Problems of communication were definitely increased by having
Management in two separate locations cooperating on the same project. 
 Exam­ining the dis'tribution of this problem across time for each group (Figure 18)
we see that different groups have problems at different times. 
Perhaps more

striking is the fact that at no
rt time during the mission was the interface
problem insignificant. Although some groups' problems peaked at certain
periods during the mission, the JSC communication problem required constant

attention. 
This points out the fact that continuous coordination between
the two centers was required throughout the mission. 
More than half of the
Managers reported this problem. 
The problem peaked during Integrated Train­ing and the 2-day simulation. It should be noted that this was the period
immediately before the simulation was scheduled to take place and that there
 
were real prospects during this period that the simulation might not happen
at all because ARC resources could not tolerate an extended delay. 
Animal
problems plagued the Managers during this period also. 
PI/Managers reported
more problems very early in the mission, during Task Training at JSC and
during the actual simulation. 
The Crew, PI, and Contractor/Manager groups'
problems occurred mainly during Task and Phase Training at JSC. 
During the
last phases of the project, all groups' participation in the study peaked

and the communication procedures were being established for the simulation.
 
Problems with Paperwork. 
Managers and Pl/Managers reported the most
paperwork problems, as well as 
the most paperwork activity. These groups
reported paperwork problems at a low, fairly constant leVel'throughout the
project (Figure 19), 
with the exception of the equipment integration phase
at JSC when their problems decreased. This was probably due to the fact
that they had more time available for their paperwork activities, having
just met a major deadline in getting the equipment shipped to JSC.
 
Group Interaction for the Entire Project
 
From the list of people with whom participants had had the most impor­tant interactions in the past week regarding SMD, we defined eight groups
according to the function of the person interacted with. For example, if
the participant interacted with a PT/Manager in reference to a management
problem, we coded the interaction as 
one with a "Manager." If the inter­action was with the same man regarding his experiment, we coded the inter­action as being with a PI. 
 Some groups with which the participants inter­
acted were not in our management study; for example: 
 Shop, Engineer (code
R) and JSC Crew. 
As these groups were an integral part of the overall
simulation, we considered them as a functional group. 
 The percentages of
all participants reporting an important interaction with each of the
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resulting groups for an average week are reported in Table 3.
 
.For participants in the weekly questionnaires, most communication was
 
channeled to ARC Managers and Contractors, followed by JSC personnel other,

than Crew (this includes JSC management). Groups receiving intermediate
 
amounts of communication were ARC Engineers and PIs, and ARC and JSC Crew.
 
ARC Shop received the least amount of communication of all groups.
 
Looking at the groups separately, some interesting patterns emerge.

Perhaps most interesting is that all three groups with managerial roles
have such strikingly similar communication patterns. All three groups were
 
characterized by frequent communication with other ARC Managers, ARC Con­
tractors, and with JSC personnel other than Crew, by a moderate amount of
 
communication with ARC PIs and little communication with the Crew. 
In
 
contrast, the PIs, in addition to their communications with Managers, had
 
more frequent contact with Engineers than any other group, but little com­
munikation with other PIs. 
PIs interacted somewhat more with the Crew than
Managers. The Crew had less frequent communications with the Managers ,than­
any other group. ..Their -importan't communications were with PIs and JSC Crew.

They were-notably lower than the other groups in theirrfrequency of commun­
ication with Contractors.
 
These datd have not been analyzed by each time:period as- the number of

'datapoints generated by this small sample would have been enormous and

would probably add little new information to that already discussed in the
 
activities section.
 
Results of the Final Questionnaire
 
How successful was the overall project in the eyes of its participants?

The post-mission questionnaire designed to assess 
this and related questions

was administered a month and a -alf after SMD III was 
completed. The ques­
tions themselves and the resuls are shown in Table 4. 
The success and
 
value of SMD III were both seen as higher'for ARC than for t-he -individuals
 
personally or for NASA as a whole, but all participants saw the simulation
 
as successful ana valuable. 
The average scores on all aspects of the suc­
cess and-value of SMD III were between 4 and 5 on a scale with 5 as the

maximum score. 
There were no significant differences between the five
 
previously described types of participants in their estimation of the value
 
and success of the mission.
 
The question about the usefulness of another simulation (or develop­
ment) of the first dedicated life science spacelab mission elicited the
 
largest variance in responses, but the average (4.04) still indicates that
 
most participants think another simulation would be useful. 
Would the same
 
participants be interested in participating in another simulation? 
The
 
response was a "qualified" yes. Seventy-eight percent checked a 4 or a 5,

fifteen percent checked a 3, and eight percent checked a 1 or a 2. 
Thus,­
most participants would be very interested in participating in another SMO,

but a few, for whatever reason, would not. 
These individuals also doubted
 
the utility of another SMD. Interviews clarified the fact that SMD III 
-
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TABLE 3
 
Significant Interactions Between ARC and Other Groups
 
Functional Groups
 
ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC JSC JSC ARC 
ARC GROUP PIs Mgrs Engrs Crew Contr Crew Other Shop 
PIs 
interacting with I11* 59 33 21 28 21 21 9 
PI/Managers 
interacting with 10 87 16 19 56 19 44 10 
Managers 
interacting with 27 87 19 19 49 8 34 8 
Contractor/Managers
interacting with 27 88 18 0 61 4 27 6 
Crew 
interacting with 55 40 18 33 8 50 33 3 
All groups together
interacting with 20 71 25 19 38 18 29 8 
*Numbers represent the percent of each ARC group which reported a
 
significant interaction with each of the functional groups in
an
 
average week.
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TABLE 4
 
Sia III Project Management Survey
 
Post-Mission Questionnaire*
 
Question Average StandardDeviation Range 
What isyour evaluation of the overallSMD III in terms of: your own role? 
success of 
4.17 
.76 3-5 
* . . ARC? 4.79 
.41 4-5 
* . . NASA? 4.21 
.62 2-5 
low valuable was the exercise for: you? 4.21 101 2-5 
* . . ARC? 4.72 .53 3-5
 
e . . NASA? 
 4.21 
.81 2-5 
flow useful would be another simulation (ordevelopment) of the first dedicated life
science spacelab mission? 
 4.04 1.14 2-5
 
If Ames is involved in another simulation,
how interested would you be in participating? 4.00 1.00 
 1-5
 
*Each question was answered on a 5-point scale which ranged from I, "not at all"
 
to 5, "very."
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satisfied the need for a development while demonstrating the importance of
 
simulation.
 
A striking point in these data is the broad acceptance of the philo­
sophy of projects such as this for a research organization like Ames. It
 
is clear that these scientific personnel are interested and enthusiastic
 
about such team efforts.
 
One question which was asked but not tabled requested respondents to
 
choose which roles they would like to fill if involved in another simula­
.tion. 
The options were Crew, PI, Manager, and Engineer. Respondents were
 
free to circle more than one category. When we examined these results, we
 
found that the majority of the PIs wanted to be PIs in another mission,

Pls with Management responsibilities wanted to be Crew/PT/Managers, Con­
tractor/Managers wanted to continue in this role, and Crew wanted to remain
 
Crew. The majority of the participants were satisfied with present roles

and desired to continue in them, perhaps adding an additional role in some
 
cases.
 
V. MAJOR ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
In this part we will draw heavily on material from the 118 interviews.
 
These interviews, which were informal and open-ended, focused on the impact

of events and policies on the respondent's role in the project and the
 
nature of responses to problems and issues. 
 The level of cooperation was
 
remarkably high. Respondents were not only candid in describing their
 
perceptions of the project but thoughtful in offering recommendations
 
which might improve the operation.
 
Impact on Other ARC Activities
 
Both interview and questionnaire data indicate that SMD III had con­
siderable impact on the normal pursuits of individual participants and of
 
three of the four Divisions. 
 For the Life Sciences Directorate as an
 
entity, this was reflected in the diversion of funds and manpower from
 
usual scientific activities to a collaborative project not designed to.
 
generate empirical, scientific data in the usual sense. 
 It meant shifting

the activities of enough personnel to influence completion of planned
 
programs under several RTOPs. For many individuals, it meant the post­
ponement or serious reduction of ongoing research for a period of up to a
 
year. The latter impact on research was caused not only by the project's

time demands on participating scientists, but also by the fact that re­
search equipment employed in ongoing research was tied up by the project.
 
Reactions to the project varied. 
 Some showed early and sustained ..
 
enthusiasm, others early doubts followed by strong commitment, still others
 
continued questioning the value of the enterprise. In general, initial
 
reactions were lukewarm. The overwhelming consensus by the end of the
 
project, however, was that the project had great value for ARC and was an
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important learning experience for scientists unaccustomed to collaborative,
 
scientific projects. Most initial resistance and reservations appear to
 
have come from the fact that participants did not perceive the importance
 
of the simulation for Ames; that it should demonstrate both Ames' capabil­
ity in supporting an integrated in-flight research program and the feasi­
bility of conducting basic life science research under the constraints of
 
space. Principal Investigators in particular tended to have less enthu­
siasm initially because they perceived the project as requiring a large
 
commitment of time without any payoff in the form of publishable data.
 
The individuals who most consistently reported interference with other
 
non-project activities as a problem were PT/Managers. This group, it will
 
be recalled, averaged over 46 hours a week on the project. For them, SMD
 
III was more than a full-time job, precluding virtually all other activities.
 
It is possible that dissatisfaction,with the interference caused by the
 
project might have been reduced had the goals for Ames and the possible
 
benefits for individual scientists, especially PIs,.been .1aid out-more ­
explicitly prior to the pr'ject. It appears, from the attitudes of'parti­
cipants, that the utility and personal benefits are now widely understood
 
and that future projects of a similar nature would have more complete sup­
port from the beginning. Nevertheless, the extent of misperceptions and
 
misgivings encountered initially in SMD III suggests that prior to the
 
initiation of future simulations or missions every effort should be made
 
by management to provide explicit information on Center and Directorate
 
goals and the expected level of commitment from participants. Long-term
 
priorities should be spelled out and prospective participants should be
 
assured that their normal job will not be jeopardized if they choose to
 
participate in the project.
 
Collaboration Between ARC and JSC
 
In general, many participants expressed satisfaction and some surprise
 
at the high quality of the collaboration achieved between ARC and JSC. As
 
we have noted, a significant proportion of the problems encountered related
 
to interface with JSC, but these figures can be misleading in that many of
 
them undoubtedly would have appeared as internal problems at ARC had the
 
project been conducted entirely at Ames. The most frequently cited problems
 
relating to inter-center cooperation concerned getting needed information.
 
Participants at Ames felt that JSC as the site of the project could have
 
been more efficient in providing information on earlier simulations, current
 
mission guidelines, equipment integration requirements, and status of ex­
perimental animals. We suggest that a central project office could have
 
alleviated many of these problems.
 
Other issues raised concerned difficulties in working with engineering
 
personnel at JSC-o~er the telephone (although some PIs reported complete
 
satisfaction with such collaboration), and the fact that several contrac­
tors at JSC were not set up to deal with particular requirements of ARC
 
experiments. For better engineering coordination between centers, early
 
efforts should be made to establish a team relationship between the engi­
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neers at one center and engineers at the other, and between individual PIs
 
and 	the engineer responsible for their equipment. 
A major source of concern
 
was the maintenance of experimental animalsat.JSC prior to the simulation.
 
If one center is responsible for delivering the animal payload to 
the other,

it should review the animal health and maintenance procedures of the reci­
pient center in order to reduce concerns of one center with the procedures

of'the other. Other interface issues will be discussed with regard to the
 
Science Operations Remote Center.
 
The 	Science Operations Remote Center (SORC)
 
The justification for a SORC is the need for an operations center close
 
to the concentration of facilities and PIs required for mission support.

Specifically, ARC has the capability for animal research and support. 
Be­
cause of this capability, ARC is the logical location for the specialized
hardware and staff required for ground control of animal studies, including

if required, yoked control groups for flight experiments. Therefore, ARC
 
also appears to be the logical receiving point for flight data on such
 
studies.
 
The general consensus of project personnel was that the concept of a

SORC was verified and that such a center can be usefully employed for data
 
presentation and communications in space missions. 
Despite overall favor­
ability, a number of concerns and problems were cited by Ames personnel.

From the PIs' point of view, the most serious were restrictions on communi­
cations with crew members responsible for particular experiments. Most felt
 
that the slow-scan TV was of restricted utility. Management personnel also
 
expressed concern that rules for communication with the Payload Operations

Control Center (POCC) and the Crew were not clearly defined (one referred
 
to them as "whimsical") and were more restrictive than necessary. 
In at
 
least one instance, an important message to 
the Crew regarding experimental
 
procedures was delayed and incorrectly relayed.
 
A number of managers and PIs expressed the feeling that the presence

of PIs in the SORC 
(or 	POCC) is essential during the conduct of experiments.
 
The experiences gained during SMD III suggest that the value of a SORC
 
in terms of scientific productivity would be enhanced by a clearer and more
 
liberal policy for POCC-SORC and SORC-Crew communications. The following
 
procedures would appear to be most desirable:
 
1. 	Provide SORC management with access to all POCC communications. A
 
video link between POCC and SORC would add to the management effi­
ciency of the SORC. 
This concept was explored during.Project Tek­
tite 2 and proved highly effective (Helmreich, 1971; Silverman,
 
1971). 
 1 
2. 	Place as 
few restrictions as possible on PT-Crew communications.
 
A separate voice channel for each crew member would be highly
 
desirable.
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3. 	A hard copy printer in Spacelab would permit transmission of
 important information to 
crew members at times when voice communi­
cations are overloaded or not feasible. 
It would also facilitate
 
the'transfer of technical instruction to the crew. 
 In Skylab,

such a facility was apparently of considerable-value.
 
4. 
Full video coverage (rather than slow-scan) would provide PIs with
 
much more useful information on the conduct of experiments.
 
The issue of communication between PI and Crew will be discussed fur­
ther in part VI.
 
The presence of at least one dissenting vote to conclusions about the'

value of the SORC should be noted. One participant felt that the critical
issue was free communication access to the Crew and the presence of the PI
 
to evaluate procedures. 
This respondent felt that the communications could
be as 
easily and perhaps more economically effected from a single mission

control. 
Perhaps future decisions regarding SORC could more appropriately-­be made by a cost-effectiveness. evaluationoyf SORC(ARC)-P040-(JSC) vs. 
POCC-

SORC (JSC).. -- ,' - : 
Principal Investigators
 
As we have noted, the majority of the PrincipaL Investigators felt
that SMD III was an important learning experience in the conduct of project

research under conditions such as 
those in space. Several did, however,
 
express 
concern over the loss of productive research time 
(a problem they
felt would be reduced in a real mission by the value of research conducted,
but not eliminated because of the greater time demands of this-type of

research). 
 Several voiced concern that PIs from universities might have
 great difficulty in adapting to 
the 	time demands and procedural constraints
 
imposed by the project environment. PIs (especially non-NASA PIs.) must be

made aware of realistic time ;requireients , -autonomy constraints, and pro­
cedural requirements. They can then appraise the impact of running a space
flight experiment on their time and resources before commiting themselvea
 
to such-ta project.
 
In one instance a university PI who did not have an in-house collabo-­
rator or Technical Monitor involved in SMD III experienced difficulty

obtaining information and keeping track of the integration of the experi­
ment. 
It has been suggested that in-house, NASA scientists should normally

serve on experiment teams and fill the role of coordinator and liaison.
 
Several also felt that equipment to be flown should be duplicated in the
PIs' labs (or perhaps in the integration facility) to facilitate other
 
research and experiment training.
 
Most of the d-ifficulties experienced by Pls centered around obtaining
information, defining roles in decision making, and establishing effective
 
communications with other project personnel. 
Several expressed a strong

need for a handbook specifying the capabilities and limitations of Space­lab and the operational organization of the mission. 
Related to this, it
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was consistently felt that not enough feedback was obtained from management

and that PIs were often unaware of modifications in procedures which in­
fluenced the conduct of their experiments. PIs and their liaisons should
be consistently informed by management, especially about any modifications
 
in procedures which may influence the conduct of their experiment. Some
 
Managers, however, felt that PIs often did not give proper attention to
information that was presented to them. 
Part of the problem may be the
 
signal to noise ratio. Some PIs suggested that they received so much ir­
relevant (for them) information that important information often may have
been overlooked. Because of this problem, we suggest that paper flow be
filtered so that only relevant information is sent to the appropriate

people. Increased clerical support would aid greatly in this task.
 
PIs expressed a need for clear lines of authority with regard to

,decisions about experiments. They particularly wanted a role in the assign­
ment of crew members to particular experiments. Considerable emphasis was
 
placed on the importance of establishing early rapport with crew members

and working together on experimental procedures. 
As we have noted above,

the need for extensive communication kith the Crew during conduct of-the 

-
experiment came up repeatedly.
 
An important reflection after the simulation was 
that the most impor­tant and effective research in this environment could be conducted by a
 
consortium of scientists with related interests and experiments.
 
All of the comments raised by PIs here and with regard to the SORC
 
appear to be thoughtful and worthy of serious consideration by management.

Suggestions regarding their implementation have been incorporated in
 
Part VI.
 
Crew
 
V> Information on issues regarding Crew-function comes from Ames person­
nel serving in prime or backup Crew roles and from other project personnel.
The precise status of Crew vis a vis Principal Investigators with regard to

their role in the execution of experiments was not clearly defined and was
 
a source of some confusion and misunderstandings. While it is obvious that
 
crew members will'carry out experimental procedures during flight, the
 
extent of their autonomy was unspecified with regard to the actual execu­
tion of the study, data collection, collaboration prior to the mission,
 
and consultation during the flight.
 
The issue of backup training for crew members was not fully resolved.
 
Initially, a backup for both Payload Specialists but not for the Mission
 
Specialist was planned. 
The intention of the Ames management was-to train

the backups to the same level of competence as the prime crew. This was
 
feasible in Task Training but was not possible during Phase and Integrated
Training because the Crew trained as 
a three-person team during these later
 
stages.
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We will not take a position on the need for backups, but do feel
 
strongly that the role of backup crew members and the extent of their com­
mitments for training should,be made clear and communicated to PIs and
 
Crew candidates at the outset.
 
The consensus of all opinions is than the scientific role of each
 
member of the Crew (Mission and Payload Specialist) must be defined and
 
the lines of authority and communication between Crew and science manage­
ment and Crew and PIs set forth. These should be made explicit to all
 
project personnel at the inception. This includes clarification of such
 
issues as whether the Mission Specialist or the particular Payload Special­
ist (or both) should be responsible for evaluating the adequacy of prepar­
ations for particular experiments. Suggestions concerning appropriate
 
crew roles in the broader context of future Spacelab missions and simula­
tions are presented in Part VI.
 
Management
 
Members of all segments ofoSMD III felt that an effective mandgement
 
team developed during the course of the project. Evaluation of this capa­
bility was seen as critical by many since very little experience with this
 
type of program management was available in the scientific areas relevant
 
to SMD III. Several respondents stressed -the fact that themanagement­
capability developed during SMD III should be used as-a basic resource for
 
future programs.
 
The majority of the comments made by Management and other personnel
 
were aimed at improving on a satisfactory performance in future projects.
 
Some are highly specific, others more general. We have previously mentioned
 
the perception of some PIs that they were not sufficiently included in the
 
network of communications, particularly regarding decisions concerning their
 
own experiments. Conversely, it was suggested -that there was insufficient
 
monitoring by Management of the progress of PIs' experiments. Project

organization did not give Management line authority over PIs during the course
 
of the mission development and simulation. This was not a serious problem

because of the cooperation of all concerned. In Part VI, however, we will
 
discuss the advantages of a more clear structure with regard to PIs.
 
It was widely agreed that some of the breakdowns in communication were
 
due to lack of staff (secretarial/clerical) support, resulting at times in
 
a seribus misuse of the time of senior personnel to prepare and transmit
 
information. Additional clerical personnel could also alleviate the signal­
to-noise problem mentioned earlier by seeing that information is. distributed
 
only where it is needed, and perhaps by labeling information as background,
 
important, actions required, etc.
 
t 
was -noted that ARC is not presently organized to support projects

which cross directorate lines or even division lines within Life Sciences.
 
Similarly, it was suggested that operations would proceed more efficiently
 
if such projects were given line budgetary status. Also, with regard to
 
broad organizational support, it was stressed that while engineering support
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for S1D III was outstanding, more project engineering resources would be
 
needed for real missions. 
It was also noted that the human factors aspects

of preparing equipment for flight (with regard to effective Crew operations)

should be given more stress in the organization of future missions. An
independent human factors review of equipment and procedures prior to inte-­
gration and between simulation and flight should be helpful.
 
Specific issues which were raised included the fact that procedures for
 
dealing with animal health questions were not set out in advance, leading to

considerable disruption and confusion during the pre-mission period. 
A com­
plete plan for backing up all crew members and other critical personnel was
 
not developed and could have led to serious problems had one or more key
individuals become incapacitated. Finally, it was suggested that simplifi­
cation of procedures could have been achieved and the duplication of equip­
ment avoided by more thoughtful integration of experiments early in the
 
project.
 
In sum, the criticisms and recommendations which were consistently

obtained seem more to reflect the difficulties inherent in.establishing

the management of a new type of operation than any inherent structural
 
deficiencies. In later sections we,will discuss the merits of several
 
procedures designed to smooth processes of communication.
 
Engineers
 
As we have noted, objective data were not obtained from engineering

(Research Support Directorate) personnel. However, interviews with Engi­
neers and other project personnel do provide insights into problems en­
countered and possible.solutions. We have mentioned the fact that parti­
cipants were highly pleased with the quality of engineering support. It
 
was felt, however, that coordination of ARC Engineers with PIs and with
 
JSC Engineers could have been better and would have been improved by

earlier effokts to establish a team relationship. :an preparing for flight

missions, where engineering demands would be far greater, the need for
 
close and effective working relationships would be critical. 
The need for
 
an adequate travel budget to establish this coordination is evident.
 
There was also some feeling that lines of authority between project

management and the Research Support Directorate could be improved. 
In
 
practice, SMD Management sometimes worked through Research Support Manage­
ment and sometimes directly with engineering personnel 
-- bypassing their
 
management structure. 
This practice can lead to misunderstandings, con­
flict, and inefficiencies in task performance. 
One approach to this prob­
lem would be to place a Manager from Research Support in a senior line
position in the project. 
 Such a person would not only provide a direct
line to engineering staff but could also facilitate liaison with PIs and
 
between Engineers at ARC and at JSC.
 
The broader issue, of course, is the difficulty involved in working

across normal organizational lines. 
 Part of the problem can be eliminated
 
by clear indication from senior management that such cooperation is in
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fulfillment of the overall goals of the organization.
 
Multiple Commitments and Time Allocation in Projects
 
We saw earlier how greatly the amount of time devoted to the project

varied between classes of individuals and within individuals across time.
 
This stimulates a discussion of the issues revolving around participation

in a long-term team effort such as 
SMD III or anticipated Spacelab missions.
 
Most senior personnel who have or may become involved in 
a program such as
SMD III are scientists who have ongoing commitments to research or research­
related activities. At 
the same time, a project like this places great
demands on the time of participants (as we have noted, much more time than
 
anticipated in many cases). 
 A reasonable questions then is whether an indi­
vidual should plan on devoting full time to 
such a project for a period

which may be in excess of a year and whether such commitment will harm his
 
professional career.
 
If SMD III can be taken as even a rough approximation, the answer is a
qualified no. 
Only the Ames personnel with multiple responsibilities (PI/

Managers) averaged a 
full-time commitment to the project (actually, it will
 be recalled, more than full time, 47 
hours/week). Of course, in real mis­
sions, time demands might be considerably greater. 
 PIs with no other re­
sponsibilities showed a rather consistent allocation of about 
 time while

other groups tended to fluctuate from half-time to much more than full-time
 
for shorter, crucial periods such as Integrated Training and the mission
 
itself. For a 
substantial number of participants, time appears to be

available, although intermittently, to pursue other activities. 
Dependable

planning and scheduling of project activities by Management could greatly

enhance the usefulness of remaining time.
 
There are several reasons to encourage scientists involved in such
projects to maintain multiple commitments, both to project and non-project

activities. 
One is based on data obtained from a 
large study of research
 
scientists by Pelz and Andrews (1976) who found that those with multiple

responsibilities were more effective as scientists. 
Along the same lines,
it is likely that the morale 
(and indirectly, effectiveness) of scientists

will be higher if they retain as much as possible of their normal program

of activity. Continuing regular activities outside the project may also

reduce the risk of losing ground professionally which was voiced as a major
 
concern by several participants.
 
Given the desirability of participants sustaining several commitments,
 
are 
there ways of facilitating this and keeping the quality of both normal
 
pursuits and the project high? 
The answer again must be qualified, but
 
seems to be yes. 
 In the case of PIs, much of the interference with ongoing

research stemmed from the disruption of laboratories by the transfer of
 
equipment to the project. 
PIs were, of all project personnel, least impacted

by time requirements, but may have lost much research time because of lack

of access to needed hardware. 
The payoff in keeping PIs' laboratories in­
tact would seem well worth the expenditure for duplicate hardware (see also
 
page 71 for comments on this point). Collaboration in research efforts
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could also assist both project and non-project research. 
To the extent'that
ongoing, non-project research involves several senior scientists, the diver­sion of one or more for significant periods to a project would have a less
deleterious effect on the operation of a laboratory. 
 Collaborative project
research should also ease time demands on individual investigators, although
not in any linear fashion. 
Adequate staff support (especially in the areas
of clerical activities and documentation) should provide some reduction in

time demands on project management.
 
Some consideration should be given to 
the desirability of designating
individuals for extremely time-consuming multiple roles such as PT/Manager
in a project. 
Pelz and Andrews (1976) suggest that this type of multiple
commitment may'produce the most dedicated and effective organization. How­ever, the demands of the combined roles may be so great as to detract from
each role as well as 
other scientific activities and professional responsi­
bilities.
 
At the organizational level, much of the success of combining or alter­nating both basic research and specific projects (such as.SMD III) hinges on­the acceptance by senior management of this dualistic philosophy of opera­tions. 
 To the extent that management personnel feel that the role commit­ment of their segment of the organization is to basic, individual research,
an individual will be penalited or inadequately supported in a dual role.
To the extent that Management embraces the dualistic approach, an individual
should be able to operate with considerable effectiveness in both settings.
It is the responsibility of senior management to guarantee implementation
 
of such support.
 
A strong trend exists in both fundamental and more applied research
toward team, collaborative endeavors. 
Much of the pressure for collabora­tion comes 
from the need to share expensive and scarce hardware and other
resources. 
Other pressures are imposed by the complexities of many research
problems which may require investigators with convergent interests and-di­
vergent expertise. The limited availability of space and time on facilities
such as Spacelab almost demands collaboration. Evidence to date suggests
that this approach rather than degrading the quality of science may, indeed,
enhance it (see page 70 for a discussion of patterns of collaboration among

Nobel Laureates).
 
A clear policy 'should be developed and promulgated by the organization
with regard to the approach to 
research to be embraced. The individual
scientist faced with participation in a lengthy project, whether as Princi­pal Investigator, Manager, Crew, or some multiple of these roles, should be
fully cognizant of the level of support he will receive for his commitment.
 
Facilitating Communication Within the Organization
 
The majority of the difficulties'encountered in the conduct of SMD III
arose from ambiguities in the specification of goals and responsibilities

and from imperfect lines of communication between relevant segments of the
organization. 
Some of these problems will disappear in future projects as
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concept-of such an undertaking matures, particularly if a cadre of indivi­duals who have gained experience in SMD III occupy significant roles in
future endeavors. 
 Others are likely to remain. There are no elegant theo=

ries of organizations which can provide sure-fire solutions or unfailing
panaceas. 
There are, however, some basic procedures which tay prove valu­
able and which, because'jf their very simplicity, may tend to be overlooked.
 
One feature of SMD III was that participants usually tended to act as
an aggregate of individuals rather than a team. 
 Notable exceptions occurred

when intensive group effort was required to meet project deadlines at vari­
ous points in the mission. 
 Scattered throughout the interviews are comments
about increases in morale and project unity which occurred after'occasional
 
social interactions and meetings. 
Group gatherings, formal designation as
 a mission team, and public recognition of team members are very simple tech­
niques to implement, but their effectiveness is proven and they were not
fully utilized in SMD III. Public expressions of support and interest by
significant members of Management are also crucial in sustaining commitment.
It is particularly important to establish a feeling of team membership in
isolated participants such as universi-ty-based PIs and separated co-workers

'such as those With similar responsibilities at ARC and JSC. 
 Several com­
ments stress the great increase in cooperation and effectiveness which took
place among ARC and JSC personnel who had an opportunity to interact face­to-face. 
The literature of organizations stresses the importance of team
feelings in worker satisfaction and their relation to performance (Katz &
Kahn, 1966) and also their particular importance in demanding, stressful

operations (Radloff & Helrnreich, 1967; Helmreich, 1971). 
 The provision of
 an adequate travel budget to enable effective face-to-face interactions
 between relevant personnel, especially among PIs and Management and relevant

personnel at each Center should be of high priority.
 
While participants can be assumed to be intrinsically interested and
motivated for projects by their professional backgrounds, recognition by

senior management of individual contributions to the project and 
the

singling out of individuals for superior achievements can serve both to re­
assure participants that the activity is valued and to maintain morale.
Particularly in a long project with peaks and valleys of demands on partici­pants, expressions of support at milestone intervals can be invaluable.
 
Because new projects such as SMD III require the definition and imple­mentation of new organizational roles, it is important for Management to be
sensitive to the kinds of strains that may be imposed on'individuals in the
organization. 
The problems involved in creating a new organizational struc­ture include the risk of creating all of the role difficulties discussed in
Part II. 
 Many of these risks of role difficulties may be reduced or avoided
by devoting some time to leadership training for Project management. By this
 we mean formal examination by Management of the roles to be filled, possible

conflicts-between and within roles, and the development of procedures to

monitor the effectiveness of role enactment. 
A series of seminars where
these issues are discussed and their implications evaluated should serve to
validate the structure of the project and to increase-the responsiveness of
Management to organizational strains. 
Argyris (1976) has discussed the
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employment, by management, of such procedures and advocates 
their,use.
 
At the beginning of a project and periodically throughout, a series of
organizational seminars for participants would be useful in providing chan­nels for the airing of problems, for the establishment of rapport, and for

the exchange of ideas. 
 Several respondents emphasized the need for 
some
kind of structured meetings where information could be exchanged between the
various elements of the organization. The successful execution of such sem­inars would require considerable planning to avoid the twin traps of be­coming forums for the presentation of management positions or 
simple gripe

sessions. Their potential value should justify such efforts.
 
Additional procedures for keeping lines of communication open are
 
presented in Part VI.
 
Evaluation of Future Projects
 
Many of the issues related-to the conduct of a major research endeavor

such as a 
Spacelab mission are also relevant to 
current national trends in
the conduct of research, as we have noted. 
A research 'literatureis begin­ning to emerge from investigations of the organization and effectiveness of

research teams and the quality of their research (Pelz & Andrews, 1976;
 
Zuckerman, 1977).
 
The number of major studies is still small, however. Thus, itappears
that more general benefits could be gained from systematic examination of
the conduct of future projects. Basic questions of interest not only for
project direction but also for the general administration of science include:
management problems in dealing with consortia of researchers; difficulties in
establishing and maintaining collaboration; personal characteristics influ­
encing the success of collaboration; competitiveness and cooperation between
and within groups; and the relationship of the quality of scientific work to
the above factors. 
The data gained from such research could be unique in
providiA' insights into the structure of complex, coordinated research of
 
all types.
 
The appropriate time to consider the desirability and scope of project
evaluation research would be after the overall structure of a mission has
been determined but before research plans and personnel assignments have
 
been made.
 
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH IN SPACE
 
-In this section we will address broader issues relevant to the conduct

of future missions under the constraints 
-imposedby the environment of
 
space. 
These issues range from the philosophy of the research endeavor

and the choice of research problems to 
the management and integration of
the personnel and equipment required. 
Many of the procedures recommended
for consideration grow out of the experiences of SMD III, others are more
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generai in origin and scope.
 
Selection of Experiments
 
The choice of particular studies to be conducted on manned spaceflights

is a particularly difficult undertaking. 
A proposal must be evaluated not
 
only on the grounds of individual scientific merit but also as part of an
 
array of studies competing for limited resources in the form of time, space

and hardware. Because of these severe limitations on mission resources,
 
strong motivation exists to select studies which will be "successful" and
 
which can be efficiently integrated into the planned program.
 
These conditions create a distinct risk that scientific management may
lost sight of the primary goal of the research program and select a less
 
than optimum array of experiments. The overriding goal should be, of course,

the advancement of science through the discovery of new phenomena and rela­
tionships or the rejection of old hypotheses. The pitfall is to define mis­
sion success more in terms of the completion of planned studies according to
protocol and the acquisition of anticipated data than in terms of scientific
 
advance. 
If this limited definition is implicitly or explicitly adopted
(and the pressures for such a philosophy are considerable), the probability

is high that research conducted will consist exclusively of what Kuhn (1962)
has called "normal science": the execution of paradigmatic research within
 
the framework of existing theories and methodologies and the avoidance of

controversial problems on the frontiers of science. 
Most of science oper­
ates most of the time under such conditions, but it seems appropriate to
 
question devotion to such an approach in the case of research in space where
 
the number of studies which can be completed is small and the cost per study

very high in terms of both money and time for planning and execution. From
 
a cost/benefit point of view, the results of a candidate experiment should
 be: (1) not precisely predictable in advance; (2) unobtainable by other
 
means 
(through earth-based research or simulation); and (3) of potential

theoretical and/or applied utility. 
Put colloquially, if you know how it
 
is going to come out, you shouldn't be doing it as research in space.
 
Even though a study meets these criteria, its scientific value may be

vitiated by other factors associated with the conduct of research in the
 
Spacelab environment. One threat to scientific integrity comes from the
 
process of integrating diverse projects to fit within the physical and
 
operational capabilities of the laboratory and the timeline available
 
during a mission. Through subtle metamorphoses, an experiment may lose
 
much or all of its scientific potential by the time it is integrated into
 
the payload and ready to fly. 
 It is possible that degradation due to num­
erous small modifications may not be apparent to the Principal Investigator
 
or that he or she may be blinded to the impact of changes by commitment to
 
the concept of a study in space.
 
A further danger is that rigid protocols for execution may prevent the

exploitation of anomalies and theoretically crucial findings. In-flight

modification of procedures may lead to significant breakthroughs if data
 
are evaluated and acted upon in real-time. Failing to follow a heuristic
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approach to the data obtained means that -many implications might have to be

explored in future missions, a costly and ineffective approach.
 
Possible resolutions of these problems will be discussed in the follow­ing section and in sections dealing,with Principal Investigators and PT/Crew

interface, and Management.
 
The Process of Selecting Scientific Experiments. Given the problem of

selecting the best scientific projects but governed by hardware, timeline
 
and integration constraints, 
a possible approach to evaluation is offered

with the realization that many problems can arise from the procedure. 
De­
spite this disclaimer, it is felt that a multi-phased approach to mission
development emphasizing the role of the PI in decision making may maximize

the probability of scientific achievement. The proposed system is more
time-cdnsuming, complex, and costly than normal evaluation, but appears
justified in relation to the cost and importance of orbital missions.
 
It is suggested that initial proposals be solicited which outline the
theoretical importance, general procedures and hardware required. 
These
proposals would be evaluated both by a peer review committee for scientific
 
merit and by a technical committee for feasibility and problems of inte­gration with other candidate projects. It the solicitation shows that there
is an extremely high level of peer review, peer collaboration and intensive
 
peer cooperation and problem solving throughout the project, this will dis­courage people from submitting poorly thought out or dishonest proposals.

They will see that any lack of integrity will be found out and cause them
professional embarrassment with both government administrators and their

academic peers. 
 Proposals could be ranked within four broad categories:
(1) not scientifically worthwhile; 
(2) not technically feasible; (3) worth­
while with technical or other modifications; and (4) worthwhile and feasible
 
as proposed. 
 It should then be possible to group proposals by theoretical

and/or methodological similarities and to ascertain overlap between studies.

At this point communication with Category 3 and 4 PIs could take place. 
In
particular, recommendations could be made that investigatora sharing theo­
retical or methodological approaches consider an integrated proposal and
that further integration with a NASA PI be explored. 
 It would be appropriate

and highly desirable to provide limited funds to PI candidates for such
 
activities.
 
This recommendation for encouraging collaboration is made in the reali­
zation that collaboration may be counter to the research style of many sci­
entists and that collaborative work may tend to seek the lowest common
denominator of scientific excellence. 
 It is felt, however, that the nature

of research in Spacelab requires a high degree of teamwork and that the
development of a team approach may be more effective if the PIs play an

active role in the process rather than having such structure imposed after
the selection of an experiment for a mission. 
.The "advantages of close

collaboration between in-house (NASA) and university and other PIs will be
discussed later in the section devoted to the role of the PI. 
 It is felt
 
that the scientific integrity of joint proposals can be maintained by having
this preliminary integration and modification take place before final peer
 
67
 
review for acceptance.
 
After PIs with proposals in the probable categories have responded to
 
initial feedback and submitted revised and more detailed proposals, final
 
scientific and technical review and acceptance or rejection could take place.
 
It is also recommended that additional scientific review by peer com­
mittee take place after acceptance and before flight simulation to evaluate
 
the impact of integration and later modifications on the scientific worth
 
of the study.
 
The essence of these recommendations is that scientific review and
 
integration of the battery of experiments proceed hand in hand and that PIs
 
be included in the process during the review and early modification stages.

The fostering of communication among potential PIs and between PIs and pro­
gram management early in planning should also aid in the creation of an
 
effective research-management team.
 
The Importance of Simulation
 
The value of the SMD III simulation in developing a management concept

and increasing the awareness and effectiveness of PIs has already been dis­
cussed. It is our conclusion that simulation of a dedicated mission prior
 
to flight is essential for the success of the research effort. 
In part,
 
this is because many PIs with important studies will not have had previous
 
experience with-this type of enterprise and need to gain high fidelity
 
experience with the type of long-distance collaboration and direction re­
quired. If the research sent into space is to be at the frontiers of sci­
ence, it is crucial that procedures and communication channels be highly
 
efficient and that a collegial relationship be firmly established between
 
the Crew and the ground-based investigator. This type of relationship is
 
crucial if full advantage is to be taken of the implications of obtained
 
data. 
Along these lines, the simulation can provide vital information on
 
the amount of flexibility which should be built into timelines to allow
 
for capitalizing on serendipitous findings.
 
SMD III was a development mission, not a pre-flight simulation. As
 
such, the experimental hardware and timelines were designed around earth­
ideal rather than zero-G constraints and were designed to stress the Crew
 
and support personnel and systems. For pre-flight simulations of.Spacelab
 
missions, however, great care should be taken to develop timelines based
 
not on earth-ideal working conditions, but on zero-G working conditions.
 
These timelines should be based on the best estimates of persons who have
 
objective knowledge of the problems of working in zero-G.
 
Essential to the success of a mission is awareness on the part of the
 
PI, Crew and Management that the simulation is not just a debugging of fixed
 
procedures but rather the pilot research and development of an approach to
 
unique scientific problems. Participants in a simulation learn the person­
alities of other project members and the most effective methods of working
 
with them. If particular individuals are incapable of coping with particu­
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lar roles or working in certain groups, personnel shifts can be accomplished

without total disruption of the project. 
In essence, problems are faced
 
while they are still correctable.
 
In the course of simulation, scientists who have not operated under
these conditions should become motivated to rehearse the effects of equip­
ment or procedural failures and to develop decision strategies for coping

with them. 
Under the conditions of simulation (where there are time,

resources, and the calmness needed to evaluate solutions dispassionately),

much better procedures can be developed than would be possible during a

real emergency if personnel had no prior experience-in dealing with per­
turbations, real or imposed, during simulations.
 
The Role of the Principal Investigator
 
In dedicated science missions, the central role is that of the Princi­pal Investigator, whose research justifies the entire project. 
An under­
standAble tendency is to recognize the importance of the PI in developing
the experiment and in analyzing and presenting the results but to overlook
his role during the integration and execution of the research. 
If the con­
cept of a Space Laboratory is to be fulfilled, consultation and direct

collaboration of the PT during the conduct of the experiment must be defined
in the project plan (see further discussion of this issue under PI-Crew
 
Interface).
 
It is possible that some PIs, especially those from outside NASA, may
be unaware or only partially aware of some of the demands and constraints
 imposed by the space environment. It seems important to make these factors
explicit and to ensure that PIs recognize them before committing themselves
 
to an experiment.
 
One element is the amount of time required for an experiment run under
 
space conditions. Training, integration, and execution require a far larger
investment of PI time than research of comparable complexity in earthbound
laboratories. 
 It was a recurrent theme in interviews with SMD III PIs that
the extent of 
this time commitment was grossly underestimated. (We have

noted that the actual time demands on PIs were not high, but disruption due
to equipment loss was often great.) 
 Any scientist considering participation

should have a realistic appraisal of the impact of 
an experiment on his

other activities, particularly the need to be physically present at an
operation center during simulation and flight. Related to this was the

opinion voiced by some PI§ that commitment to a flight experiment could re­
sult in losing ground in one's profession due to the inability to keep
abreast of current developments. 
 It was felt that this could be a parti­
cularly serious problem for PIs with university commitments.
 
A portion of the problem associated with time demands inay be alleviated
by the collaboration of PIs on a joint experiment encompassing several indi­
vidual interests. 
 Some aspects of the paperwork, training, and integration

problems may be spread out among the several participants. It may prove
beneficial, especially for PIs unfamiliar with the structure and operation
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of NASA to collaborate with a scientist from NASA. 
Critical tasks associated

with major collaboration include the establishment of high levels of mutual
trust and respect and insuring that no aspect of the study is neglected.oroverlooked through the difffision of 
 esponsibility. 
These are not insur­mountable hurdles, however, and are probably outweighed by the benefits to
be gained from a team approach to particular studies.
 
The ideas that scientists, especially great ones, are loners and that
major scientific contributions tend to be the product of individual crea­tivity are ubiquitous (for example, .see 
Jewkes, Sawers, & Stillerman, 1959;
Whyte, 1957). 
 In axrecent study of scientific elites, however, Zuckerman
(1977) has demolished these shibboleths. Overall, for example, 65 percent 
 -
of Nobel prizes in science have been awarded for research which was 'unambig­uously collaborative. 
Longitudinal data on the patterns of collaboration by
laureates clearly document the shift toward a team approach in groundbreaking
research. From 1901 
to 1925, 41 percent of the science awards were for col­laborative research;'during the second twenty-five-years, the increase was
to 65 percent. Currently, 79 percent of science laureates are honored for
collaborative work. 
Using this standard of comparison, the argument that 
-research quality must inevitably suffer from collaboration seems .both ludi­
crous and unsupportable.
 
Problems associated with th' development of a collaborative approach
have been mentioned. 
These are particularly salient yis-a-vis,relationships

with crew members who will actually carry out the research. There are two
possible roles for a crew member: 
 one is to serve as a technician, limited
to carrying out the detailed protocol established by PIs; the other is to
 serve as an extension and collaborator of the PI, carrying out the research
as a partner in the enterprise. 
The latter is closer to the'spirit of a
laboratory in space andlis more likely to result in a creative piece of
 
research.
 
Given this approach, the PI needs to be able to establish a close
working relationship with the Crew and to feel that the research is indeed
a common effort. 
This suggests a period of working together in the PI's
laboratory and a thorough explication of the theoretical and methodological

rationale for the experiment.
 
The PI must also be able to interpret and act upon data with rapidity.
If any procedural changes are to be introduced and new data obtained during
a mission, plans must be developed with the Crew and executed within a very
limited time. 
Unlike most normal research, the opportunity for lengthy

reflection and replication is not present.
 
The Role of the Crew
 
As noted above, to maximize the research potential of a mission, crew
membdrs should serve as scientists in space rather than as skilled techni­cians. 
 To fill this role as a scientist places a considerable burden on
the crew member. 
This is compounded by the fact that the pre-mission time

.demands on Crew will certainly be very high. 
Thus the risk of becoming
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professionally obsolescent in his or her major field is probably greater for
 
the Crew than for individual PIs involved in the program. 
(The problem is

similar although less severe than that faced by earlier Science Astronauts;
 
for example, O'Leary, 1970.)
 
It is-assumed that individuals choosing to volunteer for the crew role

will be aware of the potential professional loss and will have based their
 
decision to participate on other personal and professional benefits from the
 
program. Nevertheless, the diversion from professional activities is likely
 
to be a source of concern to most crew members.
 
The process of integrating the crew member with the PI to fill as close
 
to a full collaborator's role as possible may serve related purposes beyond

enhancing the scientific value of the research. 
One is to increase the in­
volvement and motivation of the crew member as surrogate experimenter. No
 
one can question the desire of space crews past and anticipated to give

maximum effort on all assigned tasks; however, the literature of motivation­
al psychology provides ample evidence that deep personal involvement can
 
even facilitate the performance of highly motivated individuals. The pro­
cess of deeper commitment to scientific experiments may also serve to broad­
en the scientific expertise of the crew member and to keep him abreast of
 
frontiers in areas with at least some relevance to his own specialty.
 
Principal Investigator-Crew Interface
 
As the foregoing has suggested, maximizing interactions between PI and
 
Crew before and during missions is seen as a major component of the conduct
 
of successful science in the space environment. Beginning with the early

planning of a mission, it would seem highly desirable for both PIs and crew
 
members to play a joint role in the assignment of Crew to conduct particular

experiments. An example of lack of consideration of this problem is the fact
 
that one backup 
crew member who was also a PI was not assigned to that exper­iment. 
 The probability of a successful collaboration ,would be considerably

enhanced if the selection were mutual rather than imposed by Management from
 
outside. 
 Obviously, the constraints of timelines and integration may not
 
allow for optimal pairings in every case, but attempts to conform to this
 
procedure as much as possible should be beneficial.
 
We have previously noted that it appears useful to have duplicate hard­
ware in the Pt's laboratory of that which will fly. 
This can enhance crew

work ii the Pt's laboratory and can reduce the negative impact on training

and the PI's research while the equipment is being integrated into Spacelab.
 
The physical presence of the PI at a communication center during simu­
lation and flight is imperative. 
Only with the PI present can decisions
 
based on data or unanticipated problems be made rapidly and effectively.
 
The presence of PIs may also serve as a subtle but significant motivating

factor for the Crew. If, however, maximum benefit from the PI's presence

is to be gained, there should be few restrictions on communications between
 
Crew and PI during simulation and flight. We have noted the.need for such
 
communication in innovative and collaborative research. 
Using communicators
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to pass information back and forth can destroy the effectiveness established
 
by earlier collaboration. As previously suggested, the provision of a tele­
type device in Spacelab to allow hard copy messages to be passed to the Crew
 
would be highly useful.' Ideally, in addition to the telex channel, a voice
 
channel for each payload crew member should be provided with provision for
 
control at the discretion of the crew member who may need isolation during
 
certain evolutions.
 
The 	Role of Management
 
The primary role of Management on a dedicated science mission should be
 
to facilitate the safe and effective conduct of the highest quality research,

remembering that success is measured in terms of the quality of the scien­
tific output, not the number of studies completed. In this section a series
 
of recommendations will be made to attempt to 
facilitate the attainment of
 
this goal.
 
1. Provide prospective Principal Investigators with a handbook which
 
details operational and organizational 
-characteristic ,of th& mssion. This
 
should include:.
 
a. 
An explicit statement of research goals and philosophy.
 
b. 	Space and hardware limitations of Spacelab.
 
c. 
Guidelines as to time available for experiments. (This, of
 
course, cannot be estimated precisely until the array of experi­
ments is integrated.)
 
d. 	Realistic estimates of the time demands dn PIs for design,
 
training, integration, simulation, and flight.
 
e. 	A statement of the organization of the project, including the
 
relationship of Crew and PIs to Management and the role of PIs
 
in decision making regarding the integration and execution of
 
the experiment.
 
f. 	Delineation of the role of the -crew member vis-a-vls the PI in
 
training and the conduct of the experiment, including specifi­
cation of in-flight communication procedures and limitations.
 
It is felt that a number of problems can be avoided or minimized if
prospective PIs embark on projects with a realistic expectation of the type

of team enterprise they will encounter and awareness that their autonomy as
 
investigators must, of necessity, be less than in normal research.
 
2. Establish a clear line of authority with regard to decisions con­
cerning all aspects of the scientific mission. 
PIs and Crew should be
 
clearly aware of the final authority for the establishment and modification
 
of procedures which directly or indirectly influence experiment protocols
 
or data.
 
The lines of authority within the project should reflect the demands of
the mission rather than the position of individuals in the larger organiza­
tion. Thus, when project constraints dictate, non-PhD holding individuals
 
may be directing the activities of senior PhD scientists. If the organiza­
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tion clearly defines these relationships potential problems from this rever­
sal of usual status relationships can be minimized-.
 
The need for a clear and effective decision making hierarchy with pro­visions for input from all segments of the program may be particularly great
if budgetary or operational conflicts necessitate changes or reducti6ns £n
planned research during mission development. Such situations, if not handled
sensitively and with maximum input from concerned individuals, are most like­ly to result in serious interpersonal conflict and to lead to the unintended
degradation of the scientific effort.
 
3. 
Vest final control for the scientific mission in a Science Manager
with authority over Mission and Payload specialists. This individual would
 
- have final decision making power over all aspects of integration and in­flight procedures (excluding flight-operations and safety-related aspects of
the flight) and would resolve appeals from both Pls and Crew with regard to
the modification and integration of experiments and timeltnes.
 
4. Maintain a scientific Peer Review Committee to evaluate .the scien­tific merit of experiments throughout the processof integration and train­ing. This body would advise and assist the Science Manager in maintaining
the integrity of the research from inception to execution and would be of
particular value in the case of disagreements between PIs and Management
regarding impact of integration on the effectiveness of experiments.
 
5. 
Establish a management position of Science Liaison Manager. 
The
role of this individual would be to serve as a link between Principal Inves­tigators and Management. One function would be to visit PIs in their lab­oratories to discuss progress and to determine if any problems which might
impact the mission are developing. 
The Science Liaison Manager would also
serve as a contact point for PIs with Management and Engineers in charge of
integration for all matters related to the experiment. 
The role function
is seen primarily as communicator rather than decision maker. 
Presumably

'both Management and PIs would see this person as an advocate in presenting

positions to the other party.
 
6. 
Include Principal Investigators and Crew to the maximum possible
extent in the decision making process regarding the integration of experi­ments, scheduling, and training. 
A frequent complaint in SMD III was 
that
PIs were not aware of many decisions which affected their experiments or
personal schedules. 
The Science Liaison Manager could play an important

role in this area in making sure that PIs are aware of problems and ques­tions regarding their experiments and in making Management cognizant of PI
problems which might require Management attention.
 
Conclusion
 
The experience of SMD III suggests that an effective management struc­ture has evolved which can integrate and conduct complex research within the
constraints of a zero-G laboratory. 
The recommendations made here recognize
this achievement and are made in the interests of developing an organization
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with open communication channels, motivated participants, and a sufficiently

clear organizational structure to reduce conflicts between the goals of
 
individual participants. At the same time, the'proposed organtzation and
 
procedures are intended'to provide 'enough flexibility to recognize the in­
direct course 6f scientific discovery and the importance of giving all
 
involved individuals a voice in decisions influencing their roles and
 
responsibilities.
 
The greatest risk in a case study such as this is that persons who were
 
directly or indirectly involved or who anticipate involvement in future
 
projects may acknowledge or even agree with the relevance of points raised
 
but may fail to examine critically their own actions and roles with regard

to these issues. Argyris and his colleagues (Argyris, 1976; Argyris & Schon,
 
1974) have discussed the problem of personal role examination extensively'.' 7
 
They recommend that individuals indulge in a careful diagnosis of their
 
actions and assumptions in critical situations, test the validity of these
 
assumptions about the causes of particular outcomes,-'and accept the fact'of
 
personal causation IfMfbimportant- 'eVents. 
Using this approach, individuals
 
may acquire an openness to organizational change and a sensitivity to the
 
causes and nature of the reactions of others.
 
If this report stimulates readers to evaluate carefully their own ro'les
 
in organizations, whatever their decisions concerning proposed procedures,
 
it will have served its function.
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Appendix A
 
NASA-AMES L:200-7
 
Moffett Field, California
 
April 9, 1976
 
MEI4ORANDUM for Trieve Tanner, Life Sciences Directorate
 
From: Joseph C. Sharp, Deputy Director of Life Sciences
 
Subject: SMS II Briefing and ARC Participation in SMS III
 
We have arranged for Messrs. Bush, Musgrave and Shumate to provide us with
 
an in depth briefing on SMS II which was recently completed at Johnson
 
Space Center. This briefing is to be held on April 22 commencing at
 
8:30 a.m. in the Space Sciences Auditorium which is located in Building 245.
 
It is intended to provide each of you with the necessary background infor-­
mation so that we can actively-participate in SMS III. It is patently
 
obvious that to survive through the Shuttleierd we-must develop the
 
capability of doing good science in the Spacelab and be'able to provide
 
the necessary "services" to all principal investigators who will be doing

biological life science research. 
The SMS III is for the Life Sciences
 
dedicated Spacelab and not for SL-1 or SL-2. 
 The service function will
 
include the design of, training for, integration of, and payload manage­
ment of the experiments that will be conducted in space.
 
In order to insure that we overcome the understandably reserved attitude
 
many of our people have regarding Ames Research Center's participation
 
in supporting and conducting life science experiments in Spacelab, I am
 
requesting that every principal investigator attend this SUS II brief­
ing. By no later than May 5 you are expected to have in my office a
 
proposed "experiment" that could be used in SYS III. Propose only those
 
"experiments" that you can do without extensive new methods development
 
or equipment design. Remember, the Spacelab simulator will have scientists
 
aboard to do the manipulations. In fact, you may be one of the people
 
selected to go aboard as a payload specialist. (Attached is the format
 
to be used for preparation of the proposed "experiments." Please follow 
it carefully.) We will hold a quasi-formal selection procedure on May 10 
using techniques similar to those we anticipate will be used later in 
selectihg actual flight experiments. 
The resources - fiscal, personnel, and space - of the entire Directorate
 
will be used to assure the successful completion of this exercise. This
 
simulation exercise may entail some personal inconveniences, including
 
temporary reassignment, curtailment of leave, some travel restrictions,
 
and/or additional travel to Johnson Space Center.
 
We have obtained an agreement from Dr. David L. Winter that the work of
 
affected tasks can either be suspended for the duration of the SMS III
 
tests or redirected to accomplish the goals of the simulation.
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I expect each ot you to attend the Johnson Space Center briefing, to
 
submit a "doable" project and, as projects are selected, to partici­
pate fully in the SMS III. You may wish to contact those who are
 
under contract or who have grants with us and ask them it they would
 
like to actively participate. Supplementary funds to the grantees
 
and/or contractors will not be available for this exercise. 
But notice,
 
for example, all of those who checked the flight experiment box on the
 
T-41 should have no difficulty in preparing a proposed "experiment."
 
You now have an opportunity to take the first tentative steps in getting
 
your program on a future flight. If we can develop the necessary skills
 
and techniques to successfully complete the SMS III, I am reasonably
 
sure we can obtain and discharge the responsibility for planning an
 
active role in the future. If we are not successfultberfutu&-will,
 
indeed, be bleak. ,--

Uoseph C. Sharp
 
Enclosure:
 
Format
 
Note: This memorandum is representative of those sent to selected
 
personnel in Life Sciences initiating the project.
 
76 
Appendix B
 
NASA-ApES LB:233-5 I)RIGINAL PAGE ISoffett Pie!c, California PF POO1 QUALITY
 
October 28, 1976
 
MEMOt,-NDUM for Distribution 
Fro;: William E. Berry, S!,D III Project Manager 
Subject: 
 StiD III Project Management Study 
Procedures for documenting- our participation in SIUD I! are being expanded.The objective inestablishing a formal documentation procedure was to develop
a 
clear picture of significant day-to-day Project activities, so that in thefuture e 
could repeat those things we have done correctly and correct any
mistakes we have made.
 
The original plan of having members of the Project team supply Mark Patton
with all records of activities relevant to the Project has not yielded as
much information as expected. The material that has been obtained, primarily
copies of official maoranda, is valuable;-and its collection will be continued.
However, since this material in itself does not seem to fulfill the objective,
a more active collection procedure is being initiated. 
Trieve Tanner ivill
take prir.ary responsibility for this part of the program. 
Dr. Tanner, or one
of his assistants, will visit you on a fairly regular schedule (once every week
or two) throughout the remaining duration of the Project to obtain the desired
 information.
 
The visits will be brief and will involve only a fe short questions regarding
your participation in the Project since the last visit. 
 The questions will be
concerned with tiqe allocation to the Project, scheduling, any problems that mayhave arisen involving hardware, training, etc. 
 The initial visit may require
more time than the others, since an attempt will be made to account for themore siginificant activities that have occurred since the start of the Project.
 
Some of you may recognize that the documentation activity overlaps withDr. Tanner's research interests in developing behavioral observation and
training techniques for improving human performance and behavior in space. 
 It
should be emphasized that, while information obtained from the documentation
exercise may benefit his research program, his participation is primarily for
the benefit of the Project. 
I recognize that most of you are already devoting considerable amounts of time
to the Project. With your other commitments in mind, Dr. Tanner and I have
agreed that the documentation exercise should be as non-intrusive as 
possibleo
Your cooperation in the exercise will contribute greatly to the development of
an effective set of procedures for future participation in similar projects.
 
-T 
William E. Berry
 
Distribution:
 
Code L
 
All SMD III Principal Investigators
 
SMD III Project Office
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Appendix C
 
SMD - PROJECT MANAGEMENT SURVEYName: 
'e"e ek of:
 
H-w much time did 
you spend on SAD during the past week? hrs. t .. 
-s there an) discrepancy between time pl-anned and time spent?-
-_ycs- o 
If yes, indicate the cause and amount of discrepancy__ 
How'was your time allocated? (Consider these categories mutually exclusive)

A. Paperwork and general ad.ministrative meetings ........ Hrs.
 
B. Program modification.................................... 
 Hrs. 
C. Equipment design/redesign 
............................ Hrs.
 
D. Clarification
....................................... 
 Hrs. 
E. Training ............................................ 
 Hrs. 
F. Other (please specify).............................. Hrs.
 
M.rs.Total (should equal the total hours, 
 above) ......... Hrs.
 
What problems have arisen during the week? 
 (Please check all applicable

.categories; do not consider these categories mutually.exciusive) 
_-Personnel 
 7._____quipment integration

2( _Equipment redesign 8.____.Time lines 
3.____Crew training I9._nterface with JSC
 
4. Getting needed information 1O. Paperwork . ..5. Interface with other SMD experiments­
6. Interference of SMD with other (non-SMD) activitiesIi. 
_ (other, specify) 
Give any comments you care to give concerning problems encountdred, or otner 
aspects "of SMD 
Please list persons with whom you have had most important interactions during
the past week regarding SMD 
Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to complete any of above 
items.
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I Appendix C
 
SMD Project Management Survey--Final Questionnaire
 
1. What is your evaluation of the overall success of SMD-III in terms of:
 
A)your own role? (circle appropriate point on scale)
 
I-----------2-----------3------------4----------5
 
not at all very
 
B)ARC?
 
------------2----------3----------- 4-----------5
 
not at all very
 
C)NASA?
 
1 ----------- 2----------- 3 ----------- 4----------- 5 
not at all 	 very
 
2. How valuable was the exercise for:
 
A)you? 
1-----------2 ----------- ----------- 4----------- 5 
not at all very 
B)ARC? 
1 ----------- 2-------------3--------- 4----------- 5 
not at all very 
C)NASA?
 
I---------- 2----------3----------4-----------5
 
not at all 	 very
 
3. 	How useful would be another simulation(or Development) of the first dedicated
 
life science Spacelab Mission?
 
S----------- 2----------- 3-----------4-----------5 
not at all 	 very
 
4. If Ames is involved in another simulation, how interested would you be in
 
participating? 
1----------- 2----------- 3----------- 4----------- 5 
not at all very 
5. If you were involved in another simulation or a flight, what role(s) would you
 
prefer to fill?(circle one or more)
 
1. Crew
 
2. PI
 
3. Manager
 
4. Engineer
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